The international legal limitations of information warfare by O'Brien, Gregory J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1998
The international legal limitations of information warfare
O'Brien, Gregory J.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/24349




Gregory John O'Brien 
B.A. September 1982, Saint Joseph's University 
J.D. May 1986, Temple University Law School 
A Thesis submitted to 
The Faculty of 
The George Washington University 
Law School 
in partial satisfaction of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Laws 
May 24, 1998 
Thesis directed by 
Ralph Gustav Steinhardt 
Professor of Law 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A 
Approved for Public Release 
Distribution Unlimited 
mc
 WAim ■—», 19990702 001 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction .. .... 3 
A. The Global Information Infrastructure 3 
B. Threats to the Global Information Infrastructure      .6 
C. Methods of Information Warfare 11 
D. Emerging Issues............ r; v....... r...; v... ......-'......... 14 
II. Discussion......-......,.«-.-,— ... ...... . r... 15 
A. Limitations on the use of force :.............. 15 
1. The meaning of "force" in Article 2(4)........................... 17 
2. Aggression .„. ,„ 20 
3. State practice ...-...:............: 22 
4. Intervention 24 
5. Cooperation 25 
B. Self-defense 26 
1. Broad and narrow meanings 26 
2. Reprisal 28 
3. Hot pursuit 32 
4. Proportionality  34 
5. Armed attack 35 
C. Law of Armed Conflict 37 
1. Laws of Hague and Geneva 37 
2. Applicability 40 
3. Applicability of Additional Protocol 1 42 
4. Necessity 45 
5. Proportionality 49 
6. Neutrality 55 
7. Ruses and perfidy ::.....-;..............60 
8. Espionage 64 
D. International Telecommunications Law 67 
E. Space Law ,.. 71 
IQ. Conclusion 78 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL LIMITATIONS 
ON 
INFORMATION WARFARE 
We live in an age that is driven by information. Technological breakthroughs... are 
changing the face of war and how we prepare for war.1 
Infortnation war has no front line. Potential battlefields are anywhere networked 
systems allow access-oil and gas pipelines, for example, electric power grids, 
telephone switching networks, In sum, the U. S. homeland may no longer provide a 
sanctuary from outside attack.2 
A panel of Defense Department experts recently warned the nation about the prospect 
of an electronic Pearl Harbor, a crippling sneak attack on the nation's defense and 
civilian information systems in which "cyberterrorists" and other unknown assailants 
cripple the nation's, or the world's, computer-networked communications, financial, 
and national defense systems,3. 
As the nations of the world become more firmly entrenched in what many 
have described as the 'Third wave,"4 or the "information revolution," the 
improvements to all levels of society are palpable. The increases in network 
connections throughout the world have improved communications, made commercial 
trade more efficient, and provided access to information previously thought 
unimaginable. Unfortunately, as with the previous world-changing'devolutions," this 
third wave has also created a change in the way power is allocated among and 
security is threatened by nations. In a paradoxical way, the information revolution 
1
 Dr. William Perry, former Secretary of Defense, quoted in Roger C. Molander, Andrew S. Riddile, 
and Peter A Wilson, STRATEGIC INFORMATION WARFARE: A NEW FACE OF WAR 1 




 The Threat of Computer Warfare, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 8,1997, at AI8. 
4
 Richard W. Aldrich, The International Legal Implications of Information Warfare, OCCASIONAL 
PAPER NO. 9, at 6 (Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy April 1996). 
promises the greatest contributions to mankind's development since the agrarian or 
industrial revolutions but also has the potential to wreak great havoc and turmoil on 
theworld. 
All over the world, states are examining the ways this information revolution 
can be used to ensure national and world security. At the same time, these states are 
^determining the ways in which this revolution can threaten security. With the rise in 
the world's dependence on the 'information highway" has come a commensurate rise 
tn the number of information bandits along that highway who have the ability to crack 
"cybersafes" and steal money; infiltrate nationaldefense information systems; and 
issue extortionate threats to key elements of a nation's mfrastiueture like airtraffic 
control systems or communications networks or electrical power control systems. 
The study of the impact of the information revolution on traditional concepts 
of warfare has only begun over the last few years. Just as the information revolution 
has dramatically changed fife in general, it has similarly created a "revolution in 
military affairs" in the world's militaries.5 Concepts and techniques of what has 
quickly become known as ^formation warfare" are being studied and developed the 
world over. This revolution promises to change the way future wars are waged. 
The growth of information warfare has also spawned a revolution of softs in 
the legal aspects of waging war. Traditional notions of warfare and the customary 
laws resulting from them are being challenged in a way never anticipated when those 
laws began their development. Because of the nature of this new medium and the 
5
 Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public International Law, 37 Harv. Int'l 
L. 1272,273(1996). 
way it can be used as a method of warfare, it is unclear how amenable traditional 
concepts of the laws of armed conflict will be to information warfare. 
This paper will examine the ways these traditional concepts are challenged 
and will attempt to suggest proposals for those areas in which traditional concepts 
might not be susceptible to a clean application to developing notions of information 
warfare. Part I of this paper will set forth background information about information 
warfare - how it is defined; how it is currently employed; how it is developing into a 
threat to world security. Part II will be a discussion of the laws governing the use of 
force in the post-Charter age, including the traditional laws of armed conflict, and an 
examination of how these laws apply or do not apply to this developing method of 
warfare. It is noted at the outset that this discussion will not include an examination 
of "conventional" methods of information warfare, like targeting sites with bombs, 
missiles, or other munitions. Those methods are sufficiently limited presently by the 
existing laws governing the use of force. Part HI will conclude with 
recommendations for a possible course of action to accommodate this developing 
method of warfare. 
L Information Warfare Background 
A. The Global Information Infrastructure 
The global information infrastructure (GH) is a combination of facilities, 
services, and people which allows anyone from any place to send and receive 
information when and where they want to at an affordable cost on a nearly 
instantaneous basis.6 It includes the physical facilities used to transmit, store, 
process, and display voice, data, and images.7 As a reflection of the progress 
information technology has made in a relatively short period of time, the first  
transatlantic cable message in 1858, consisting of 90 words, took over 16 hours to 
transmit.   Fifteen years ago, few cellular telephones or computers existed, and 
Internet access was limited,9 Today, there are about 180 million computers in the 
United States, and, worldwide; there are about 1.3 million local area networks.10 
The backbone of this infrastructure in many ways is the Internet. The Internet 
is not really a thing. Rather, it is a collection of many things.11 The Internet is better 
conceived as the potentialxonnection of any of millions of computers around the 
world.    Each computer on the Internet is managed independently by persons using 
common communications standards; a packet switching network, for example, sorts 
data into standard packets then routes these packets to destinations via an 
indeterminate number of intermediate routing stations.13 
6
 Peter N. Weiss & Peter Backlund, BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE 302 (Brian Kahin & Charles 
Nesson ed 1997). 
'Id. 
8
 Sandra K Kinkaid, The Record Carrier Industry, in Am. Bar Ass'n, TOWARD A LAW OF 
GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS 78 (Anne W. Branscomb ed. \9%6y{hereinqfter 
TOWARD A LAW OF GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS). 
9
 CRITICAL FOUNDATIONS: PROTECTING AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURES (hereinafter 
CRITICAL FOUNDATIONS), The Report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, 9 (October 1997). 
10
 Id. 
A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet As A Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, 130, in BORDERS IN 




 Froomkin, supra note 11, at 130; Kanuck, supra note 5, at 272. 
The creator of the Internet, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), was   ; 
attracted in the late 1960'sto this seemingly anarchical way of sending and receiving 
information since DOD wanted a communications system that could still function 
even after a major catastrophe, like a nuclear attack, destroyed a large fraction of the 
system    Thus, the Internet allows messages to reach their destinations through one 
of many different routes between computers.15 
Throughout the world, nations have invested heavily in linking their states 
with other parts of their countries and with the rest of the world. In the U.S., OVCT $2 
billion has been spent on research to find a way to electronically connect nationwide 
schools, libraries, hospitals, and clinics by the year 2000.16 In the European Union, 
over $3.8 billion has been spent to support the new information infrastructure in the 
EU, while in Japan, the government is spending between $150 and 230 billion to 
connect every school, home, and office by the year 2015.17 A recent G-7 ministers' 
conference on the information society concluded that a smooth and effective 
transition to an information society is one of the most important tasks to be 
undertaken in the last decade of this century.18 
14
 Froomkin, supra note 11 at 131; Sean Selin, Comment,Governing Cyberspace: The Need for an 
International Solution, 32 Gonz. L. Rev. 365, 367-368 (1997). 
15
 Selin, supra note 14, at 367. 
Henrikas Yushkiavitshus, Law, Civil Society and National Security: International Dimensions in 
THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION AND NATIONAL SECURITY 46-47 (Stuart J.D. 





This information technology explosion has dramatically changed most aspects 
of private, commercial, and public lives and business. Profound change in the 
marketplace, interdependency, restructuring, and reliance on technology have resulted 
in the global economy's irreversible commitment to the Gil.19 The GH and its 
component national information infrastructures (Nu) have developed into complex 
management systems with substantial information-based resources involving the 
control of electric power, the flow of money, air traffic control systems, and oil and 
gas production and use.20 
B. Threats to the GD  ,^ 
Cyberspace has no territorially-based boundaries because the cost and speed 
of message transmission on the Internet is almost entirely independent of physical 
location: messages can be transmitted from any physical location to any other site 
without any physical cues or barriers that might otherwise keep certain 
geographically remote places and people separate from one another.21 To complicate 
matters, the domains used in the process of transmitting information do not 
necessarily indicate their place of origin. For example, one might have a domain 
name associated with a server in a different physical location; a server with ".UK" as 
a domain name might not be in the United Kingdom, and ".com" could indicate 
19
 CRITICAL FOUNDATIONS supra note 9, at 10. 
20
 RAND Report supra note 1, at xiii 
21 David R. Johnson & David G. Post, The Rise of Law on the Global Network in BORDERS IN 
CYBERSPACE supra note 6, at 8-9. 
physical presence anywhere in the world.22 Thus, users are generally unaware of the 
physical location of the pieces of hardware in a network, and, consequently, it is 
extremely difficult to trace the place of origin of a particular piece of computer 
information. 
This interconnection and anonymous placelessness of the Gil have created a 
set of vulnerabilities the study of which has only recently begun.23 Today, a 
/" 
computer can cause switches or valves to open or close, move funds from one 
account to another, or convey a military order almost as quickly over thousands of 
miles as it can from next door, and just as easily from a terrorist hideout as from an 
office cubicle or military command center.24 A computer message from Earth can 
steer a vehicle and point a camera on the surface of Mars; a false or malicious 
computer message can traverse multiple national borders, leaping from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction to avoid identification, complicate lawful pursuit, or escape retribution. 
Those studying the issues raised by the information revolution have faced as 
an initial quandary the problem of acceptably defining the concept of information 
warfare.26 Additionally, the term is loosely used to refer to in lieu of or in addition to 
^Idatl. ■■■:.;■ 
23
 See CRITICAL FOUNDATIONS supra note 9 at 7; REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE 
BOARD TASK FORCE ON INFORMATION WARFARE - DEFENSE (hereinafter Defense Science 
Board report), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Technology (November 
1996) at 3. 
24
 CRITICAL FOUNDATIONS supra note 9 at 7. 
2iId 
26
 Aldrich, supra note 4, at 6. 
this term like infowar, netwar, and command and control war.27 Others define 
information warfare as an electronic conflict in which information is a strategic asset 
worthy of conquest or destruction.28 
The current DOD definition of information warfare is: 
Actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting an adversary's 
information, information-based processes, information systems, and 
computer-based networks while defending one's own information, 
information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based 
networks.29    
Information systems are the organization, collection, processing, transmission, and 
dissemination of information in accordance with defined procedures, whether 
automated or manual; in information warfare, this includes the entire infrastructure, 
organizations, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, and 
disseminate information.30 
These concepts are best understood by examining a few prominent "cyber- 
attacks" perpetrated by individuals and by organizations in the recent past. In 1995, a 
Russian student in St. Petersburg accessed the Citibank database 40 different times 
and gained entry to Citibank's cash management system With access to the bank's 
daily transfers of over $500 billion, he was able to transfer more than $12 million to a 
27 Id. at 2. 
28
 Id. 
mST1^ ait& of Staff Instruction 3210.01, Joint Information Warfare Policv, of January 
JA     Saeace APPUcatJons International Corp., Information Warfare: Legal, Regulatory Policy, 
and Organizational Considerations for Assurance (2d ed July 1996)(hereinqfter SAIC Report) 
30
 SAIC Report, supra note 29. 
private account until he was arrested.31 In New York, 2 individuals used a seamier on 
a windows!« to steal over 80 thousand cellular telephone numbers from motorists 
driving along a Brooklyn highway and used those telephone numbers for about $1.5 
million per day in fraudulent phone calls.32 A disgruntled employee of Sun 
Microsystems penetrated Air Force computers and allegedly retrieved air tasking 
orders that delineated military targets in the event of a real-Kfe conflict.33 
Not surprisingly, organized groups have availed themselvesi ofthes benefits of 
information warfare. The doomsday cult in Japan that launched a Sarin nerve gas 
attack in the Tokyo subway broke into the mainframe of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 
as part of an effort to arm itself with laser weapons.34 The United Nations was 
victimized by a group of cyber-bandits when 4 of its computers containing all of the 
data concerning human rights violations in Croatia were stolen; the theft dealt a heavy 
blow to the U.N.'s efforts to prosecute war crimes.35 Finally, banks in London, New 
York, and Tokyo paid over $500 million to cyber-terrorists who demonstrated to the 
banks an ability to bring their respective computer operations to a grinding halt.36 
^ Jima(^}^oma^DeterrinS Information Warfare: A New Strategic Challenge ir 
PARAMETERS, Winter 1996-1997, at 81. 
32 
J^wT° ~J ^-RENT AND FUTURE DANGER; A COMPUTER SECURITY INSTITUTE 
SSSS^ COMPUTER CRIME AND INFORMATION WARFARE"(Computer Security Institute 1996) at 29. •* 
33
 Winn Schvvartau, INFORMATION WARFARE AND CYBER-TERRORISM PROTECTING 
YOUR PERSONAL SECURITY IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE (2d ed 1996). "' 
34
 Power supra note 32 at 20. 
35
 Id at 24. 
36
 5^ C, UUc]^Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors, 23, (Center for Advanced Concepts 
and Technologies, National Defense University 1997). 
However one might define information warfare, it is now possible for a Hindu 
fanatic in Hyderabad or a Muslim radical in Madras, or even a deranged "geek" in 
Denver, to cause immense damage to people, cities, or, with some effort, to armies  
10,000 miles away.37 Whatever or whoever the origin of the threat, H can be 
classified into two broad types of threat: the ability to manipulate perceptions,  
emotions, interests, and choices through the use of telecommunications and the speed 
with which information assaults can be conducted, giving crisis managers little time 
torespond.38 
In a well-known study, DOD concluded in 1995 that its unclassified computer 
systems had been accessed without authorization over 250,000 times; out of this 
number, only 5% of the users knew of the improper access and, ofthat number, only 
2% made a report of h.39 Top officials in the U.S. government have stated that 
information warfare presents the swiftest growing threat to national security.40 
On the other hand, several commentators have suggested the threat may not be 
as real as intimated. A major information attack against the U.S. military, for 
example, is statistically improbable, although it does not mean that an attack against 
some parts of the national security apparatus or the economic interests of the U.S. is 
37
 Schwartau, supra note 33 at 398. 
38
 Thomas, supra note 31 at 85. 
39
 Libicki, supra note 36 at 25; Schwartau supra note 33 at 20. 
40
 The Director of Central Intelligence, John Deutsch, said that hacker attacks present the second 
greatest threat to national security after weapons of mass destruction; the Deputy Attorney General, 
Jamie Gorelick, believes that information warfare is the nation's premier security threat Libicki supra 
note 36 at 9, John Deutsch, Terrorism, FOREIGN POLICY, Sep. 22,1997 (Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace). 
10 
unlikely.41 While h is unlikely as well that a state would employ only information- 
based attacks in attempting to conquer another state, information warfare will be 
critically important in creating the 'Tog of war" that produces an atmosphere of   . ■_.. 
disorientation that then enables conventional forces to seize the opportunity of 
invasion.42 Additionally, it would be extremely difficult to completely block the 
functioning of the NU to the point where it equates to a war-time blockade, but, 
conversely, for a state that has grown so dependent on information flow, an attack   : 
aimed at main points of information distribution could resemble a physical economic 
blockade.43 
Despite the differences among commentators about the likelihood of an 
information attack and its scope, declarations by states undoubtedly proclaim their 
assessments of the size of the threat. Russia, for instance, has declared that the use of 
information warfare against Russia or her armed forces would categorically not be 
considered a non-military phase of a conflict, whether casualties result or not, and 
Russia retains the right to use nuclear weapons against the means and forces of such 
an information attack.44 
C. Methods of Information Warfare 
To understand how the laws concerning die use of force may apply to this 
developing area of warfare, it will be helpful to know how this concept may actually 
41
 Schwartau, supra note 33 at 371. 
42 Libicki, supra note 36 at 28-29. 
43
 Libicki, supra note 36 at 67-72. 
44
 Thomas, supra note 31 at 82. 
11 
be implemented. Aside from the description of some consummated attacks listed 
above, information warfare can be conducted in the following ways: 
Command and control, the ability to generate commands and communicate 
with deployed forces is disrupted; 
Electronic warfare, degrading or disrupting the flow of electrons of 
information;   "" ^     ^  =^ r ^ -. y 
/'■' 
Intelligence-based warfare, the integration of sensors, emittors; and processes 
into reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and bomb damage assessment    " 
systems; "•"■"•--- --'■"-■' -    --«-■— -,- 
Psychological operations, actions to affect the perception, intentions, and 
orientation of a decision-maker; 
Cyberwar, the use of information systems against virtual personnas or groups; 
Hacker-warriors, persons who destroy, degrade, exploit, and compromise 
information systems; and 
Economic warfare, use of information systems to create an information 
blockade.45 
These attacks can generally be carried out by corrupting the hardware or 
software in a system; using an insider with access to an information system; external 
hacking; or flooding the system with mcoming calls or requests for data.46 
Additionally, an info-warrior can insert a virus into a telephone-switching system; 
45
 Thomas, supra note 31 at 83, citing Libicki, What Is Information Warfare, Center for Advanced 
Concepts and Technology (National Defense University 1995). 
46
 Libicki, supra note 36 at 15,17; Greg Rattray, The Emerging Global Information Infrastructure and 
National Security, 21-FALL Fletcher F. World AfF. 81, 84 (1997). 
12 
implant logic bombs set to detonate at a predetermined time and disrupt, for example, 
rail line switching grids; or simply access a message distribution system and transmit 
a phony message.47 
A new kind of weapon is being refined - the computer malicious code 
(CMC).48 CMCs are software that intentionally cause undesired and unpredictable 
consequences when inserted inside computers or networks.49 Typical CMCs are 
viruses, as described above; worms, which self-replicates itself and overloads the 
power of a computer; trojan horses, which copies information that is later used by a 
hacker to gain entry to an otherwise secure system; logic bombs, which sit inside 
software until a predetermined detonation time; and trap doors, which allow 
undetectable entry into a network.50 
How these new methods of warfare can be used was the subject of a study by 
the RAND Corporation for DOD. Using its conventional, "The Day After...," 
scenario-based exercise model, RAND presented senior members of the DOD and the 
intelligence communities an exercise involving a conflict between Iran and the U.S. 
in the Persian Gulf area.51 The exercise concluded that a coordinated series of 
seemingly random information attacks on different communications, logistics, and 
47 Douglas Waller, Onward Cyber Soldiers, Time Magazine, August 21,1995, VoL 146, No. 8. 
48







 RAND Report, supra note 1. 
13 
an 
transportation links in the U.S. would seriously inhibit the ability to respond to a swift 
conventional invasion on the Saudi Arabian peninsula.52 
D. Emerging Issues 
The background materials should indicate there are prominent issues in the 
application of international law to information warfare äs a method of fighting wars. 
There is general agreement that, in information warfare, there are no front lines and 
traditional territorial boundaries are blurred.53 Determining state responsibility for 
attack will be extremely difficult since attacks are largely anonymous, and tracking 
down perpetrators of an attack is very hard to do.54 
State sovereignty and territoriality face grave challenges from information 
warfare. Through sovereignty, a state combines the intangible idea of a people with 
the tangible construct of a political and economic entity.55 Statehood is characterized 
by the exercise of sovereignty, which is best understood in terms of political and 
economic control.56 Ironically, the very technology which has linked the world 
states by telecommunications may render states' laws, framed in terms of power 






 Id.; Thomas, supra note 31 at 84. 
54
 Libicki, supra note 36 at 49-51. 
55 
Douglas H. Dearth & R Thomas Goodden, CYBERWAR SECURITY STRATEGY AND 
CONFLICT IN THE INFORMATION AGE 277 (AFCEA International Press 1996). 
Alexander D. Roth, The Struggle for Coherent International Regulatory Policy in TOWARDS A 
LAW OF GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS supra note 8, at 339.  ' 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, AN EXPLORATION OF LEGAL 
ISSUES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION 12 (Paris 1983). 
14 
In this uncertain environment, the stage is thus set to determine whether the 
traditional laws concerning the use of force can be applied to information warfare or 
whether new rules will need to be developed. 
a DISCUSSION 
A. limitations on the Use of Force 
From the beginning of modern international law in the mid-seventeenth 
century through World War H, a state's unilateral use of force as a matter of its 
conduct of foreign relations was a legitimate exercise of its discretion.58 Following 
World War n, though, the United Nations Charter imposed an agreed prohibition on 
the unilateral use offeree by states. Articles 2(3) and 2(4) of the Charter were 
viewed as the two most important declarations of states, weary of a twentieth century 
filled through its midpoint with unprecedented carnage and violence, to formally and 
finally outlaw war as an instrument of foreign policy and interstate relations. 
Article 2(3) provides: All members shall settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and 
justice, are not endangered. 
Article 2(4) provides: All members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use offeree against the territorial integrity or 
58
 Mark W. Janus & John E Noyes, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 
(West 1997). 
15 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations. 
These two provisions were seen by most observers as the heart of the Charter 
and the two most important principles of modem international law.59 States thereby 
accepted the^bhgation to settle all disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the 
use or threat of use of force in their international relations.60 
The Charter framework permitted only two exceptions to this otherwise total 
ban on the unilateral use offeree: force used in self-defense against an armed 
attack,61 or when authorized by the Security Council to restore or maintain 
international peace and security.62 Thus, the Charter does not outlaw all 
demonstrable uses offeree, particularly for credible reasons of self-defense, but it 
does carefully circumscribe when forced may be used.63 
As such, nations agreed after World War H that peace was the paramount 
value, and that grievances and sincere concern for ^national security" or other vital 
' Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1620 (1984). 
60
 Id. 
Article 51, U.N. Charter, provides: Nothing in this Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations 
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. ' 
62
 Articles 39 and 42, U.N. Charter. Article 39 provides: The Security Council shall determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 41 provides for measures not involving 
the use of armed force that the Security Council may authorize. Article 42 provides- Should the 
Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have 
proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
63
 David J. Scheffer, The Great Debate of the 1980s, in RIGHT V. MIGHT- INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 1,4 (Council on Foreign Relations 1989). 
16 
/' 
interests would not authorize the start of a war.64 Future wars could thus only be 
justified as a war against an initial aggressor - in self-defense by the victim, in 
collective self-defense of the victim by others, or by all.65 
1. The meaning of "force" in Article 2(4).       ....'_. ..._. 
Article 2(4) has admitted to much ambiguity over the last 50 years as states 
have urged particular exceptions to it when particular uses of force have not neatly fit 
into the actual Charter exceptions.66 Indeed, some scholars have questioned whether 
Article 2(4) is so vague and uncertain that a state might plausibly justify any use of 
force it chooses to exercise.67 
One ambiguity is whether Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force if not 
intended as a matter of conquest. That is, some suggest that the prohibition applies 
only to force designed to deprive another state of its territory, while others suggest 
that the proscription includes any force that violates territorial borders, however 
temporarily and for whatever purpose.68 Professor Henkin argues that the answer is 
revealed in the way states behave in acting to prohibit or condemn armed aggression: 
64
 Louis Henkin, The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy in RIGHT V. MIGHT 37, supra note 63. 
65
 Id. 
66 Although beyond the scope of this paper to discuss these suggested exceptions in detail, they are 
worth mentioning particularly in light of the UN. 's proclivity since the end of the Cold War to enlarge 
the uses of force in the name of maintaining world peace and security. Those exceptions include use 
of force for humanitarian intervention; to support self-determination; to intervene in the name of 
socialism; and to restore or institute democratic government Henkin, supra note 63; W. Michael 
Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10 Yale Journal of International 
Law 279 (1985). 
67
 Schachter, supra note 59 at 1621; see also John F. Murphy, Force and Arms in UNITED NATIONS 
LEGAL ORDER 247-318 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher Joyner ed 1995). 
17 
or invasion, attack, or occupation (however temporarily); sending armed bands 
mercenaries to another country; bombing; blocking ports; and attacking btherforces 
wherever they may be located, are all prohibited uses of force'9 
Another ambiguity in Article 2(4), and one most critical to the "idea of 
information warfare, is what acts constitute a use of force. The concept of force is 
itself ambiguous and is susceptible of a broad and a narrow reading.70 In the broad 
sense, force includes all types of coercion, whether they be physical, psychological, 
financial, political, or economical.71        ~ — - .- 
When the Charter was drafted; the subcommittee assigned tö construct Article 
2(4) considered whether the prohibition on the use of force should include measures 
short of armed attacks such as economic or psychological measures. The 
subcommittee, after extensive consideration, rejected the inclusion of economic 
measures in the meaning of Article 2(4) and, consequently, Article 2(4) was generally 
understood to apply only to armed force.72 
The work of the International Committee of the Red Cross that led in 1949 to 
the signing of the four Geneva Conventions73 lent support to the view that Article 
2(4) applied only to actual armed intervention by one state into another state's 
territory. According to the rapporteur for those Conventions, Jean Pictet, those 
68
 Henkin, supra note 63 at 39. 
69
 Henkin, supra note 63 at 41. 
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73 These Conventions will be discussed in more detail, infra. 
18 
Conventions were meant to apply to any difference between two states leading to the 
intervention in one state by another state's armed forces.74 This view certainly 
supported the idea that Article 2(4) only limited the crossing of an international 
border by one state's military forces. As such, at least in the early days of the 
Charter, the defining characteristic of prohibited "force" seemed to be that of physical 
confrontations.75 
One writer has suggested that force is anything that compels a state to take a 
decision or action it otherwise would not have taken or done.76 Under this view, a 
state would commit an act offeree if its state-controlled automobile manufacturer 
dumped a fleet of underpriced cars into a foreign market and that foreign state had to 
enact trade barriers to protect its domestic producers. More pertinently, under this 
view, a state which had to take action to ensure network security because of 
unauthorized entry into its information systems by elements of another state could 
consider that intrusion an act of force and be permitted to respond in kind. This 
intrusion, though, would lack the physical aspects of what states ordinarily 
understand to be manifested in a demonstration of force. While the intrusion would 
undoubtedly be unlawful, the question would be whether it is unlawful because it is 
74
 Aldrich, supra note 4, at 7. 
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 Id.; See Henkln, supra note 63 at 47-49; Professor Henkin notes that the International Court of 
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76




the improper use of force or for some other reason. It is readily apparent that 
information warfare will not lend itself easily to considerations of "physicality" in 
assessing whether it constitutes force. _   r.    ,     ^   _ ^ 
2. Aggression. _   ._..     _ 
The General Assembly has tried to inform the meaning of the term ftorce" by 
qualifying it in terms of aggression. Obviously due tothe experience of World War U 
and the Nuremburg trials where a *Svar of aggression" was found to be a war crime, 
the United Nations has implicitly equated 'Yorce" with aggression.77 As with the 
efforts to define the limits Of "force" in Article 2(4), the General Assembly's work in 
defining the term "aggression" split into two views: newly independent states saw 
the term as including all types of coercion, whether by armed attacks or by economic, 
political or psychological coercion; Western states interpreted the term restrictively 
and generally rejected a broad interpretation.78 Ultimately, the General Assembly 
limited the definition of aggression to those acts having physical attributes of 
assaulting another state's territory, that is, armed military intervention, albeit for 
whatever reason.79 
'' See Benjamin B. Ferencz, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION- THE SEARCH FOR 
WORLD PEACE (Dobbs Ferry NY. 1975) for a general discussion of the General Assembly's 
development of the Resolution defining aggression 
8
 Atdrich, supra note 4 at 13. 
79
 Kanuck, supra note 5, at 288=289; "Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another State[.]" Resolution on the 
Definition of Aggression, art. 1, GA Res. 3314, UN. GAOR, 29* Sess., Supp. No 31 at 143 UN 
Doc. A/9890 (1974). ' 
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The Resolution on Aggression contains a nonexclusive list of examples of acts 
constituting aggression, including: 
Invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State ofthe territory of another 
State, or any military occupation, however temporary; 
Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against another State's territory; 
Blockage of ports or coasts by the armed forces; and,,'{' 
An attack by one State's armed forces against another State's armed forces.80 
One can possibly construe this Resolution as still being ambiguous and not 
providing concrete limits on information warfare. For example, one writer concludes 
that it is not possible to equate a naval blockade, which the Resolution prohibits, and 
an information embargo by denying one state access to its own information systems.81 
A U.S. Navy international law expert was quoted as wondering, "When does 
manipulation of information qualify as a use of force? Somewhere along the 
spectrum which ranges from the broadcasting of T. V. Marti or Radio Free Europe to 
the physical destruction of foreign communications facilities, the line of force is 
crossed, but I do not believe we know where that line is yet."82 
It may be that information warfare will produce a reexamination ofthe limits 
on aggression advanced by developing states and focus on the economic and 
Resolution on Aggression, supra note 79, art 3. 
81
 Kanuck, supra note 5, at 289. 
r ^-f*.2.88"2??« .quotiliS CaPtain David P63«*. who, at the time, was head of the Navy's international 
law diyisiott Ultimately, the meaning of aggression is intertwined with the concepts of peaceful use 
of the high seas and of outer space. A similar debate about the meaning of "peaceful" uses of those 
areas has developed, and, in each instance, state custom has defined this term as permitting military 
uses of those areas that are not "aggressive." For a more detaileddisoission of "«acefm purposes" 
see sections IIC6 and HE, infra. ' 
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; uses 
psychological threats posed by this new medium of warfare. Conversely, since such a 
review would likely still focus on the status of the actors and the purpose of an 
information attack, it is not likely that the Resolution would be amended in the near 
future. 
3. State practice. ^ :..:-f... .--- r -      , 
Rather than search only in multilateral treaties for limits on the us&of 
information warfare, it will be instructive, in the view of Professor Schachter, to look 
to states' practice to determine whether a particular use of information warfare is a 
use of "force."83 Additionally, it would be very instructive to examine the personnel 
involved in a particular action and the goal to be achieved through the action. In this 
respect, then, a customary understanding of the limits of information warfare should 
develop. 
In this light, an information warfare "attack" directed by electronics 
technicians of a state's armed forces, at another state's vital services, like electrical 
power grids or telephone systems would more clearly represent an armed attack 
coming under the provisions of article 2(4) than one, for example, on purely 
economic systems like a state's stock market or national banking system.84 As such, 
where data manipulations result in significant destructive effects that are 
83 See Schachter, supra note 59, at 1623. Professor Schachter, in discussing what acts qualify as force, 
advises that much can be drawn from the way states attempt to justify certain actions as permitted 
under the Charter. In this respect, by basing a particular action on, for example, article 51 of the 
Charter, a state implicitly acknowledges that the action under review is a use of force which, if not 
justified by article 51, would, therefore, be prohibited by article 2(4). 
84
 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Cyberattack! Are We At War?, NCSA News (Nov. 1996), quoted in 
Hanseman, Robert G, The Realities and Legalities of Information Warfare, Air Force L. Rev. 173,184 (1997). 
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indistinguishable in any meaningful way from those caused by traditional kinetic 
weapons, such assaults constitute "armed attacks" for purposes of article 51.85 
Additionally, one should consider the efforts of various states to develop 
information warfare defense programs in determining what acts of information 
warfare might qualify as "force." 4Jy developing defenses for particular threats, states 
are implicitly concluding that such threats are potential uses offeree against which it 
is necessary to defend. The only question then would be to determine the issue of   - 
state responsibility if some personnel other than that state's armed forces are involved 
in the particular means of information attack at issue. 
In this respect, one might argue that information warfare is not included in the 
meaning of Article 2(4) since it does not involve an armed force entering into another 
state's territory. This nettlesome problem has indeed created conceptual difficulties 
in international law enforcement where scholars and legislators have struggled with 
ways to prescribe and enforce jurisdiction over cyberKsiminals.86 It is difficult to 
know whether an intrusion into one's information system represents the exuberance 
of a youthful hacker or a test of a state's destructive warfare capability; accordingly, 




 See e.g., Henry H Perritt, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 V11L L. Rev. 1 (1996); M E. Bowman, 
International Security in the Post=Cold War Era: Can International Law Truly Effect Global Political 
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 Bowman, supra note 86, at 1942. 
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4. Intervention. 
The United Nations added to the understanding of Article 2(4) when it began 
in the 1960's to consider the proliferation of newly independent states born from then- 
former colonial forebearers. These states banded togetherto put on the General 
Assembly's agenda a number of issues meant to affirm their status as independent 
states and to limit the influence of the Cold War powers in manipulating the internal 
affairs of these new states. One result of these efforts was the resurrection of the 
notion that Article 2(4) should include non-armed force measures like economic or 
political coercion. Attempts to expand Article 2(4) were resisted but, nonetheless, the 
General Assembly did pass a significant resolution creating the Declaration on 
Intervention.88 
Significantly, the Declaration on Intervention provides: 
1. No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed 
intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the 
personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are 
condemned; 
2. No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political, or any other 
type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination 
of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind. 
Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, 
Declaration on the Inadmissability of Intervention into the Domestic Affairs of States and the 
Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A_Res. 2131,20* Sess., Supp. No. 14 at 108, 
UN. Doc. A/6014 (1965)Qiereinafler the Declaration on Intervention). 
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terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of 
another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State[.] 
Thus, while the Declaration on Intervention undoubtedly would proscribe 
some types of information warfare, it does not do so as part of Article 2(4).89 
5. Cooperation. 
Another General Assembly Resolution provides another potential limit on the 
use of information warfare. In 1970, the General Assembly passed the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations9^ which reaffirmed the Declaration on Mervention and purported 
to restate existing customary law regarding the principle of nonintervention.91 Like 
the Declaration on Intervention, this declaration serves to protect a state's territorial 
integrity and political independence from outside coercion. Each declaration contains 
broad statements about the type of outside influence that is prohibited. In cases 
where information warfare would plausibly not qualify as a use offeree, these 
Declarations could still limit the use of information warfare in certain cases. 
See Kanuck, supra note 5, at 276. Mr. Kanuck mentions that the Declaration on Intervention is not 
part of Article 2(4) since that Article only speaks to "threat or use of force" but it is a part of the 
customary law attributes of state sovereignty. He also notes that what constitutes intervention, as with 
the use of force or aggression, is subject to disparately varying interpretations (essentially, the broad 
versus restrictive views common to the views of force and aggression) even though all states generally 
agree that intervention is illegal 
Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, G. A Res 2625 U N GAOR, 
25  Sess., Supp. No. 28 at 121,123, UN. Doc. A/8028 (1970). 
91
 David Wippman, Change and Continuity in Legal Justifications for Military Interventions in 
Internal Conflict, 27 Colum Hum Rts. L. Rev. 435,445 (1996). 
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B. Self-Dcfensc 
1. Broad and narrow meanings. 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter permits the use offeree in individual or 
collective self-defense against an armed attack. It was crafted as a way to ensure that 
a state in the post-Charter age did not have to become a hapless victim of an 
aggressor state that chose to ignore the Charter's prohibitions on the use offeree.92 A 
debate about the scope of self-defense has accompanied Article 51 almost from the 
onset of the Charter. 
As with the scope of the content of Article 2(4), two main schools of thought 
about the meaning of Article 51 have arisen. One school, which interprets Article 51 
strictly, limits the use of defensive force to those instances where an actual armed 
attack is occurring.93 Under this reading, a state would have to try to exhaust all non- 
force, diplomatic means of resolving a dispute, and risk receiving the first wave of 
assault by an aggressor state, before being permitted to respond legally with force in 
kind. 
The other school, which advocates an expansive reading of the Article, holds 
that the Charter did not eliminate the principles of self-defense as they were 
understood prior to the Charter, but, rather, the Charter merely reaffirmed the 
customary understanding of self-defense.94 The customary understanding, which 
most scholars conclude was most appropriately voiced by Daniel Webster during the 
92
 See Schachtcr supra note 59, at 1634=1635. 
" Stuart G. Baker, Comparing the 1993 U.S. Airstrike On Iraq to the 19S6 Bombing of Libya: The 
New Interpretation of Article 51, 24 Ga J. Inrt & Comp. L. 99,109 (1994). 
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Caroline Incident, does not require a state to receive the first wive of assault before 
being permitted to reply in self-defense.95 Nor does the Carolinestandard require 
recourse to all available diplomatic means. Rather, the justification for the use of 
force is that there is no time or choice for any reasonable alternative other than using 
force because of the immediacy and certainty of the threat.96 
The International tourt of Justice in the Nicaragua case concluded that the 
Charter did not eliminate the customary understanding of self-defense.97 It also " 
conceded that the concept m^^^ 
absence of any reasonable alternative in limiting a response to a threat of attack.98 
The Id's opinion is strongly persuasive authority to"conclude that the Caroline 
principle is embodied in Article 51. To date, though, the outer limits of the principle 
are not settled. 
95
 Rex JZ^s Preliminary Thoughts on Some Unresolved Questions Invohnng the Lcc* of 
Anticipatory Self-Defense, 19 Case W. Res. J. Inf 1L. 129,173 (1987} J 
*^y*^te,Self-HelplnComb^^^ 
Sf!.™       ^T^T1!?^* °n the Umits rf ** Cardins *"*«*« «* because of the 
S^^-ia£Tdagit *! *Bne rf *"«*"*<* the threat In short, the restrictive view of 
tins standard is that the aggressor has to have his finger on the figurative trigger before force in setf 
as the gun is being loaded and aimed. Zedalis, supra note 95, at 173. 
ISSJ^jJf; WDefawjmdthe Rule of Law, 83 Am J. Int'I L. 259,260-261 (1989); see 
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Closely related to self-defense is the concept of reprisal and its validity as an 
international custom in the post-Charter age. Reprisal was given its best pre-Charter 
expression in the arbitration between Germany and Portugal concerning the 
lawfulness of German military coercion against Portugal in Angola in 1914." A 
reprisal, prior to the Charter, was permitted when: an offending state committedan 
act contrary to international law;, the injured state must make a demand on the 
offending state and that demand goes unsatisfied; and the force used in the reprisal 
must be proportionate to the offending act,100 Using this formulation, a state in 
committing reprisal could actually act in a way that was otherwise contrary to 
international law because of the inequity of the initial offensive and unredressed act. 
Many hold that the Charter outlawed reprisal as a legitimate method for states 
to ensure their self-protection.101 The Corfu Channel case is most often ched as the 
basis for this conclusion. In that C3se, the ICJ held that the United Kingdom violated 
Albania's territorial integrity by sailing into her territorial waters with the intent to 
retrieve naval contact mines that Albania had laid there to block international naval 
passage through the Corfu Channel.102 Even though the British intended only to 
" Naulilaa Incident Arbitration, Portuguese-German Arbitral Tribunal, 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 409,2 R. 
Int'l Arb. Awards 1012 (1928), discussed in Rex J. Zedalis, On the Lawfulness of Forceful Remedies 
for Violations of Arms Control Agreements:  "Star Wars " and Other Glimpses At The Future, 18 
N. Y.U. J. Int'l L. & PoL 73,116 (1985). 
100  rj 
101
 Roberts, supra note 96, at 282=285; Note, Terror and the Law, supra note 97, at 486. 
102
 Roberts, supra note 96, at 276; see Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Alb), 1949 ICJ Rep. 4. 
retrieve these hazards to navigation to present as evidence of Albania's illegal acts, 
the ICJ condemned the British for committing an unlawful reprisal.,03 
The view that reprisals have been outlawed in the post-Charter world finds 
support in those uses offeree that have resembled reprisals but were presented as 
cases of self-defense pursuant to Article 51. The most notable examples of such uses 
offeree were the U.S. attack on Libya in 1986^^ the Berlin nightclub bombings 
and the Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon in 1982 to strike at terrorist groups 
that had harbored themselves there. More recently, the U.S. airstrike on Iraq in 1993 
after the aborted assassination attempt on former-President Bush in Kuwait was, 
likewise, defended as an act under Article 51. The significant point of each of these 
incidents was the care with which each was defended as a matter of self-defense and 
not as a vaguely legitimate reprisal. Thus, it well could be that the practice of states 
has been to recognize the illegitimacy of reprisal and to implicitly recognize an 
obligation to try to justify a Use offeree as a defensive measure under Article 51.104 
The concept of collective self-defense, when applicable, has not had as 
controversial 8 record of understanding in the Charter. Typically, the use offeree in 
collective self-defense has been justified only in those cases where a victim state has 
actually requested assistance from a third state.105 This has been so even in those 
cases where a collective self-defense treaty may arguably have permitted a third 
103
 Schachter, supra note 59, at 1*26; 1949 ICJ Ren. at 35. 
See Schachter, supra note 59, at 1626-1627; Jordan I Paust, Responding Lawfully to International 
Terrorism: The Use of Force Abroad, 8 WhittierL. Rev. 711 (1986X 
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party's use of force even when hot requested to do so by a victim state.106 More 
troubling cases have been when a state has trfed to justify an act as one of mdividua! 
self-defense when the facts and circümstances'surrouhdinga case have indicated the 
station really was one of purported collective self-defense, albeit there was no 
official request for assistance from a victim state.107 
The initial hurdle m^pjiying these concepts to information warfare is to 
consider whether a particular information attack qualifies as an armed attack. 
Presumably, if it does so qualify; Äen the victim state is entitled under the Charter to 
respond proportionately to the attack Conversely^ the initial information attackis 
not seen as a use offeree, thenthe' Victim" Äe wöuM nsk, wh^ in 
kind or through a more conventional attack, being branded as an aggressor in 
violation of Article 2(4). At the very least, the putative victim state would risk 
running afoul of the Declarations on Friendly Relations and Interve^™ VA* ;nu\a\ 
attack was not seen as a use of force or a threat of force 
Assuming that a defensive reply is permitted, the issue of what would 
constitute a proportionate response, in terms of a commensurate information attack, is 
raised.108 If the attack is already consummated by, for example, a virus that infected a 
»»fee Herikhujupra note 63, at 47; 1986 ICJRep. 14,105 (even existence of regional collective 
defense treaty did not obviate need for victim stete to request assistance): 
107
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t^c application of Article 51to-a response based solely on pure information warfare. Additionally a 
re«vS!m«!mbmmg:pm«mftsnn^ ^^ 
tn 
particular network, does thispermh the victim state to launch a similar virus aimed at 
a network of the offending state? Alternatively, is the victim state limited in this 
instance to ridding its network of the virus and lodging a diplomatic protest? To 
complicate matters, if the victim state is not limited in its defensive response to a 
response in kind, could a victim state launch a larger information attack against the 
t\PfctvtA\r\t* C*«*A ao <* wair ff\ -TA*VA1 «mKcwtnant tn-G-vrtwafirwi a-H-arArcO 
f"*Ar+ai«1\r : a t%itrr/\r-ttYia<*A r^cnAncA   \uttA-n « Aafi»r\c*\tt* tvmlv ic T>flrw*HfifL hsfi 
nm/Ai* 1\AA*% ramiiroil      T^t-Hic WAT» *4*A PQCA   fKflrn +ria nnrnnco T\Arttiil Imft fivr/*» itt GAITI 
rfo&ncA />/\ TATIA! tliA at+a/*1A wmiM VIA CM/ATAIY UndfilTYiinfid     Thifi-lS-bSCSüSÄ tfe£ 
mitiotinn c+a+a. xiz/wiM KO-WA -t%/\ i«/*AT**-trrA £*\ dl*5CfintinnS lt*J~2ttHck if it klSSW tfest 
ttttA-moti/vnal law t%ArwittA/1 *\«1i/ a ttt-frw-tot £C£2.1ati/\tt ftf a COS-fHct    Ths tisbt tO SClf" 
defense inchides, then, me right to use sufScient force tö repel the attack and not 
simply to stall it or even just to stop it. Accordingly, it would not be reasonable to 
hold that a victim state could only reply in kind to an act of armed force.109 
The real question will be where the virus ortherlogic bomb or the Trojan 
ijQrcg ijac. ajrgarKr Kggn identified and measures to cleanse the information system 
a4+orAr£%A VIOI/A K**<*n toVon      TUof ir   *VIä icei-iA w7*-rti1/1 \\A nA\attl\ckf <M%  etAAii-if*.-t\**.\ <rf+«/>lr /WJ. 
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the aggressor state is permitted. Does this scenario look more like the case where two 
Iranian gunboats-have released their missiles ata surface vessel in the Persian Gulf 
and turned awa™ to return to nort (in which case there is arguably no right to engage 
ttirvcA unite MTitW fivrf»»\ nr An&c it 1r»/\lr nTOTS liks thfi CÄSfi whfiTS tbfi terrorist 2T0UD h3S 
more easily reviewed under Article 51 since the primary focus on such a response would necessarily be 
based on the conventional tactics. The information warfare component of such a combined response 
would in all likelihood not receive mwch critical analysis. 
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strafed the Rome and Vienna airports, bombed the nightclub in Berlin, and are 
preparing a new, imminent attack? 
The question, of course, begs the answer. The simple fact that weapons were 
released will not normally be the only information available to an on-scene 
commander. Rather, he will have intelligence reportsto supplement his battlespace 
awareness that will inform him about the degree of the threat he feces. He will also 
have awareness of the events leading up to a particular attack in terms of the-political 
situation at hand, the parties likely to present a threat, their degree of sophistication, 
and other factors, all of which will bear on a decision to act in self-defense. In short, 
the more an information attack looks more like a concerted, strategic strike, based on 
all available pieces of information, the more likely the right of self-defense will arise. 
3. Hot pursuit 
The customary right of hot pursuit permits a state to pursue into international 
areas one who committed a crime in the territory ofthat state. Pursuit could continue 
unless and until the perpetrator entered his own territorial space of the territory of a 
third state.110 
The difficulty here is when, if ever, a perpetrator, during the course of hot 
pursuit in cyberspace, crosses into the sanctuary of a home state or third state. 
Suppose a foreign intruder in a network was detected and that intruder began to 
"escape" before his electronic capture. The architecture of the information 
109
 Roberts, supra note 96, at 272-273. 
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infrastructure could complicate legal replies to the illegal intrusion. As mentioned 
earlier, the information infrastructure is not really a highway with clearly defined 
routes from point A to point B. Rather, it is an amalgam of servers, connections, 
telecommunications lines, personal computers, and other hardware and software 
where often the path from point A to point B never follows the same course. Instead, 
it "gets there" by the"most electronically convenient means available at that particular 
time. Thus, the victim state has little way of knowing through purely information- 
based pursuit that he will be following the same path as the perpetrator nor that any 
responsive actions will not mtrude on the territory; if it exists, ofsome third state. 
In this respect, the 1986 airstrike against Libyais instructive for any similar 
extraterritorial reply against an information warfare aggressor. In that instance, 
American bombers based in England were denied permission by France and Spain to 
overfly those countries on the way to bombing Colonel Quaddaffi's headquarters in 
Libya.   l The planes, instead, had to fly over the eastern Atlantic Ocean then through 
the airspace over the Strait of Gibraltar.112 Assuming there could be some claims of 
territoriality laid on the segments of the information infrastructure, an aggrieved state 
could find itself with little protection if it had to obtain the consent of a number of 
other nations to pass through their "territories" on the way to completing an otherwise 
lawful act of self-defense against an aggressor state. 
111
 Baker, supra note 93, at 105. 
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4. Proportionality. 
In using defensive force, a state mast ensure it uses only force proportionate to 
the force to be countered. Suppose, for example, there was reliable evidence that the 
simultaneous "downing" of the eastern seaboard's telephone systems and the New 
England electrical power grid were tied to the efforts of a rogue state and there was 
credible evidence that this group^was about to launch a similar attack on the Midwest 
as part of an effort to sow confusion in the United States while planning for a more 
conventional assault on the country. 
Assuming these acts could be viewed as aggressive attacks, assume next that 
the only way to block the next wave of information attack would be to infect the 
rogue state's electrical system with a virus. This action would have the effect of 
cutting off all power to the country's hospitals, the irrigation system, and the 
refrigerants needed to maintain essential medicines at an acceptable level. As a 
result, civilian deaths would surely result. Because of the redundancy of systems in 
the United States, disruptions to essential services and financial networks from the 
initial attack would be severely disrupted but only a minimum of American lives 
would likely be lo$t. 
A detailed discussion of the aspects of proportionality and necessity in the law 
of armed conflict will be discussed further in this paper, in section IIC4 and 5, infra, 
but the issue bears raising now as it relates to self-defense. Obviously, the technology 
available to either side to a conflict will raise nettlesome questions about what is 





At present, much of this discussion about proactive forms of information 
warfare in self-defense may be premature. Discussions to date about the national 
security aspects of information warfare defense have focused on network security and 
contingency plans in the event of significant network disruptions caused by 
information attacks.113 Little attention has been given to the prospects of "offensive'? 
information warfare acts of self-defense. What focus that has been made is closed 
in classified programs at the Pentagon.514 
5. Armedattack. 
Information warfare raises the chance to examine whether the focus of Article 
51 should be changed from "armed attack" to a term that more reaHstically 
accommodates the threat posed- by irrforrnatkm warfare. It is illogical to concede that 
an electronic attack could have potentially more devastating and widespread 
consequences on a state than a terrorist's truck bomb yet refuse legitimate acts of serf- 
defense because the putative attack was not an "armed attack." Even replacing that 
term with "aggression" would not yield a satisfactory result since that term, too, is 
currently limited to "armed" aggression. 
Conversely, it could be potentially destabilizing to come too quickly to 
redefining the terms when the scope of the information battlefield and its tactics are 
still too uncertain for quantification or qualification. There is definitely a ready 
See CRITICAL KXJNBAHQ^n^nete 9. 
See Defense Science Board Report, supra note 23, at 10. 
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temptation to assume too much about the potential of information warfare as a means 
of warfare. It will probably not, in the views of some commentators, totally replace 
conventional forces and arms nor will wars of the future ever be fought entirely by 
computers.m 
As such, to change the Charter too quickly would very likely result in 
unintended consequences. One readily apparent consequence is that the 
understanding of'force" and "aggression" mightyet cometo include non-military 
types of aggression like economic, psychological, or political coercion. It is believed 
that the 50-plus years of the Charter have shown that rejection of these concepts from 
the original understanding of "force" was a prudent and stabilizing decision. States 
are probably unwilling now, if they ever will be, to consider certain types of 
economic coercion to be a use offeree that would justify military responses. 
Otherwise, then we are only steps away from coming full circle to the days of 
conquest and wars of national right that prevailed in the 17th and 18th centuries. 
Certainly, that is not a path down which many states should be willing to go. 
To summarize, the use of information warfare in defense against an 
information attack will depend initially on whether that first attack is considered an 
armed attack. In certain cases, such a conclusion can be drawn. In that event, 
proportionate action in self-defense is permitted. If the responsive act will result in 
unintended damage, a balancing of interests would be necessary to determine whether 
the proposed reply should be undertaken. 
115 
CRITICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 9, at 17-19; Defense Science Board Report, supra note 
23, at section 2.0, p. 4; Libicki, supra note 36, at 28-29. 
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C. The Law of Armed Conflict 
1. The Law of the Hague and the Law ofTxenevav 
One area of international law that has potentially the greatest bearing on the 
tactics employed in information warfare is the law of armed conflict. This law is 
contained in conventional ana customary law. Some of the customary aspects of the 
law of armed conflict, such as self-defense and hot pursuit, have already been 
discussed. This section discusses more fully the law contained in what is 
conveniently referred to as the Law of the Hague and the Law of Geneva. 
From the custom and usage of nations, these two bodies of law developed.'1"16'" 
The law of the Hague governs the application and conduct of force and the legality of 
weapons.117 The law of Geneva, on the other hand, has come to be known as 
"humanitarian law" because it regulates the use of force to reduce unnecessary 
suffering particularly among civilian nonparticipants to a conflict.118 
The laws of the Hague and of Geneva can be briefly summarized in the 
following manner: the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is 
not unlimited; it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such; 
distinctions must be made between combatants and noncombatants so that 
116
 Ariane L. DeSaussure, The Role of the Law of Armed Conflict During the Persian Gulf War: An 
Overview, The Air Force Law Review, 41, 42 (1994); Judith G. Gardam, Noncombatant Immunity and 
the Gulf Conflict, 32 Va J. Mt'l L. 813, 816 (1992). 
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 DeSaussure, supra note 116, at 42; Gardam, supra note 116, at 816. 
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 DeSaussure, supra note 116, at 42; Gardam, supra note 116, at 816. 
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noncombatants be spared as much as possible.119 These principles are stated and 
repeated in numerous conventions and declarations of the customary law of armed 
conflict, the most notable of which are the Hague Conventions of 1907,120 the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949,121 and the 1977 Geneva Protocols I and II Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949V12* Besides these convention^ sources, the law of 
armed conflict is reflected ina great deal of customary international law as weE123 
v/jÄÄ?! ^u Targettn* ****** *>»**»" <" *• Persian Gvlf, 31 Va J. MIL 593(199 ); Captain Roach notes that these three principles are part of the cornerstones 
of the customary law relating to armed conflict They have been codified in JSOCC-I I AZST 
OT W^A^W0"8^19^'!125 UNTS- 3 (1979)' rePrirted » DOCUMENTS ONSLAW 
SLn^,S     ^^ £,e,ff2ded 1989X^^Cr DOCUMENTS ONLAW OF WAR) The Umted States signed tins Protocol but has not ratified it The United States agrees that the 
Protocol is'declaratory of customary international law. Roach, at FN 3; Francis V. Russo Tarzetine 
Theory in the Law of Naval Warfare, Naval L. Rev. 1,25-26 (1992): these principles cSb^Sed 
SS« f 0WSK <!) *e right of a belligerent to adopt means of inju^gI eSmy^S 
unlimited, (2) only combatants and legitimate military objectives may be attacked; (3)force mav onlv 
be used when requned to achieve legitimate military objectives; (4^e impact on noncomtos a^d 
notary objectives must not be disproportionate to the value of the mSy objeSSsW 
^f C^,an SUffering md deStmcti0n not **"« ""der the prince cf^rZahlt 
T rhe ^T? ^agUe'2*** Conference * 1907 led to the conclusion of thirteen conventions (ten 
nWÜ17^lar lIand and maritime ^ "* « dec,aration plating to a p.SESJd of 
conductmg^rfare). These conventions codified many customary principle! of laS Svall^are 
AeJlni?6      *" dCVd°Pment rf "*■ «I**» «ri- warfare. Many principles ZSST 
these mentions were reiterated in the later Geneva Conventions of 1949 (hereinaftS GC 1949) and 
^ÄF*        Pr<ÜOCOlS AdditionaL *■ DOCUMENTS ON LAW OF WAR,suptmeuTat 
•JS^kre^* each of the thirteen conventions.  Hague Convention IV, RentingthTiws 
and Customs of War on Land, has an Annex setting forth substantive regulations SSSS^Z 
SriT     !S **»?«» « *• authoritative substantive provisions of the ConvenSd 
their articles are often cited as articles of the Convention and not the Regulations. 
«in J1* * 94I?nT ^P'0^0 cogence produced these four conventions, relating to wounded and 
SN\TW o?wÄ md -tapWn?£* PriS°nerS rf W« "* Pr0teCtion rf civflia* DOCUMBST UJN LA  UF WAR, supra note 119. 
T ^.^^^arnplified the protection accorded to victims of international armed conflict and for 
the first time, codrfied protections for victims on noninternational armed conflicts. Id 
™I<L at4. The; importance of customary law in the law of armed conflict is reflected in the 1907 
Hague Conventions, each of which contains what is known as «the Martens Clause " This clause 
likewise, contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, states that 
IS vm!^TOTplete ^ of Ae^^^ 
think rtnghtto declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by 
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The thrust of these principles is to attempt to make armed conflict more 
humane by minimizing unnecessary suffering either through direct armed attack or 
through the collateral effects of an armed attack. 
Under these principles, only military objectives may be attacked.'24 Military 
objects are those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use, effectively 
contribute to the enemy's war-fighting or war-sustaining capability and whose total or 
partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would .constitute a definite military 
advantage to the attacker under the circumstances at the time of the attack.125 
Article 52 of Protocol I Additional limits the use of force against military 
objects as a means of providing general protection to civilian objects. Article 52.3 
specifies that, 'In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to 
civilian purposes,... is being used to make an effective contribution to military 
action, it shall be presumed not to be so used."126 Thus, the law seeks to protect 
civilian objects by applying a presumption that they are not ordinarily used for 
military purposes. 
them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the 
principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between 
civilised nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public 
conscience. 
m
 Roach, supra note 119, at 596. 
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 Id at 596, quoting Art 52 of Protocol I Additional. 
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 Article 52, Protocol I Additional. 
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2. Applicability 
A threshold question is whether these laws of armed conflict even apply to 
information warfare. This raises again the question whether pure information warfare 
would be a use of armed force under article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. The Hague 
Conventions apply in «War" while the C^eva Conventions generally apply in times 
of declared wars or during periods of mtemätional armed^onflict.,27 The question; 
then, is whether use of pure information warfare could be considered "'armed 
conflict." " 
At first blush, it may seem difficult to conclude that mjectihg a virus into 
information system or planting a logic bomb into a computer chip equates to the 
of precision guided missiles or the crossing of an armored division across a territorial 
frontier. Nonetheless, the Geneva rules, at least, did not concern themselves with 
such minute analysis. Rather, those rules focused on a broad interpretation of acts 
that could be considered to be part of an armed conflict. The Commentary of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions indicated that: 
[ajny difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of 
members of the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of 
Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It 




See Hague IV, art 1; Hague K, art 1; GC1949, common articles 2, 3. 
™ COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF 
CIWJANPERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 17-21 (Jean S. Pictet ed); see W. ZyS^^otlZ 
the Avatars of International Peace and Security, 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 93,121 (1996). 
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Thus, the focus of the Geneva Conventions protections is two-fold: any 
difference between two states and any intervention of members of the_armed forces. 
That the limitation on intervention is not described in terms of a traditional notion of 
an armed invasion or strategic bombing indicates the preference for the law of 
Geneva to be of a wide scope. Further, "any" difference between states apparently 
triggers the Geneva protections, so long as there is a causal connection between that 
difference and the intervention of members of the armed forces. 
Whether states actually agree with such an interpretation according a broad 
scope to the law of Geneva probably matters little, since states' practice indicates that 
they do agree with such a view.129 In the United States armed forces, for example, 
commanders and operational units are routinely briefed on the laws of armed conflict 
and their applicability to any situation potentially involving the use offeree.130 
Moreover, while much discussion recently in the development and 
implementation of information warfare has centered on the defensive, protective 
aspects of it, it cannot be denied that attention is also being paid to the offensive 
capabilities of the concept as well. In the United States, the offensive capability of 
information warfare is being studied in classified channels, so this article must 
necessarily remain at the theoretical leveL Presumably, though, these studies are 
being conducted with the idea that the laws of armed conflict will apply to it. 
Additionally, as a practical matter, it would be inconceivable for a state to 
argue that it is using its military forces to develop what functionally appears to be a 
129
 See Schachter, supra note 97, at 273. 
130
 See DeSaussure, supra note 116, at 58. 
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warfighting capability and then to deny that the laws of armed conflict do not apply to 
it. Again, much can be concluded from the manner in which''states justify particular 
actions. In this area, it will be inconceivable to imagine a state, under these 
circumstances, suggesting that its armed forces are exempt in this area from the laws 
of armed conflict. As such, it can safely be concluded that the laws of the Hague and 
of Geneva will apply to information warfare. A 
3. Applicability of Additional Protocol I 
The applicability of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions to 
any international armed conflict further scrambles the propriety of information 
warfare. Two of the main parties in the Persian Gulf War, the United States and the 
United Kingdom, signed the Protocol but have not yet ratified it. The reasons for not 
ratifying the Protocol were that it was perceived to untenably legitimize terrorist 
forces as "freedom fighters"; to inject a subjective component to the proportionality 
analysis where a military commander could be easily second guessed about the tactics 
used to destroy a legitimate military object; and to impose a presumption that an 
object was not of a military character if it appeared that targeting it would result in 
excessive civilian casualties.131 
DeSaussure, supra note 116, at 48-50; Gardam, supra note 116, at 826-827; Letter of Transmittal 
from President Ronald Reagan, Protocol H Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating 
tothePr(rtectionofVicümsofNon-InterratioiialAmedCor^ic^S.TreatyDoc No 2 lOO^Ccm 
1 sess. at ffl (1987), reprinted in 81 Am. J. Int'lL. 910 (1987)(President Reagan forwarded Protocol 
U, which provided protections for civilian persons in armed conflicts not of an international character 
and recommended ratification but decided not to forward Protocol I for Senate consideration)- 
Schachter, supra note 105, at 466, noting that the presumption in Protocol I in favor of classifying a 
object as a civilian object remains controversial because it encourages states to camouflage military 
operations m a protected enclave. ^ J 
an 
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There is strong evidence to suggest, however, that the U.S. and U.K. acted in a 
way during the Gulf War that showed their acceptance of the Protocol I provisions. 
The planners of the air campaign against Iraq went to great lengths at different points 
to emphasize that target selection and airstrike missions were done in a way to 
minimize civilian casualties.132 
Moreover, the U.S. Navy and Air Force, at least, in their;field manuals on the 
laws of armed conflict, contain prescriptive provisions that mirror the language of 
articles 51 and 57 in the Protocol.133 The U. S. Army field manual on the law of 
armed conflict, conversely, does not contain similar provisions,1 ^and the official 
view of the Army is that Protocol I does not apply to U.S. military operations.135 
Rather, the Army's view is that proportionality is limited, not to the Protocol I 
requirements, but to the customary limitations that civilians not be targeted directly or 
negligently; excessive casualties among the civilian population does not render 
nugatory the legitimacy of the military character of an object nor the necessity to 
DeSaussure, supra note 116, at 59; A. P. V. Rogers, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 43 45 
(Manchester Univ. Press 1996Xnotingthat some legitimate military targets we not bombed because 
of the potentially excessive civilian toll). 
Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 1-14M, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval   ■ 
Operations, para 8.1.2.1; Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 110-31, International Law- TheConductof 
Armed Conflict and Air Operations, para 5-3; accord Francoise J. Hampson, Proportionality and 
Necessity in the Gulf Conflict, 86 Proc. Am Soc. Int'l L. 45,46-47 (1992). 
"* See Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare. Note though, 
that para 41 of FM 27-10 provides that "[L]oss of life and damage to property must not be out of 
proportion to the military advantage to be gained" 
135 Gardam, supra note 116, at 830-831. 
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destroy it if h would provide a military advantage.136 In short, military necessity, 
under this view, always overrides proportionality.137 
Additionally, there is a sharp division of views that state behavior during the 
Gulf War indicated an acceptance of the Protocol I provisions on proportionality.138 
As such, it cannot confidently be said that state practice during that conflict showed 
that the provisions of Protocol I have acquired a customary status. Still, while the 
exact balancing calculus required by articles 51 and 57 of the Protocol may not be 
customary law, it is probably safe to conclude that states do take some account of the 
anticipated effects of an attack on the civilian population in deciding whether to 
proceed.139  To that extent, then, there is at least the contours of a principle of 
proportionality that would restrain a commander from attacking even an undeniably 
military object. 
For information warfare, the problems raised by this issue will be in the 
targeting of those dual use systems which serve as a vital resource for the civilian 
Id, see also W. Hays Parks, Air Warfare and the Law of War, 32 A.F.L. Rev. 1 (1990). Professor 
Gardani also notes that another point of disagreement about Protocol I is that some consider the 
proportionality requirement to apply only to the overall conduct of a conflict and not to the discrete 
component airstnkes or infantry assaults ofthat conflict Gardam, supra note 116, at 831. 
137
 Contra DeSaussure, supra note 116, at 48 (noting that necessity emphatically does not override the 
humanitarian aspects of the laws of armed conflict and quoting Jean Pictet, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross Commentator for the 1949 Geneva Conventions that the humanitarian 
rules are peremptory norms). 
Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 Ant J. Int'l L. 381, 408-410 (1993) 
and supra note 116, at 834-835; Fritz Kalshoven, remarks to American Society of International Law 
Implementing Limitations on the Use of Force: The Doctrine ofProportionality andNecessity 86 ' 
Proceedings Am. See. Int'l L. 40,41-42 (1992)(Protocol I did not apply); Hampson, supra note 133 at 
45-47 and Schachter, supra note 105 at, 465-466 (Protocol I did apply). 
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 Again, there is evidence from the Gulf War air campaign that certain military objects were not 
bombed because of concerns for the impact on civilians neaiby. E.g., Rogere, supra note 132 at 43 45 
(switching stations and not generating stations in Iraq's electrical power grid'were attacked to permit 
quicker post-War recovery of power, dams or other water supplies were not attacked for fear of 
flooding civilians). 
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population as well as retaining an undoubted military utility. It remains to be seen 
whether states will continue to officially abide by Additional Protocol I but, as a 
practical matter, seem to honor the Protoa>l more in ignoring H. 
4. Necessity 
The concept^fnecessity has long been a cornerstone of the laws of armed 
conflict. First stated conventionally in the 1856 Paris Declaration and the 1868 St. 
Petersburg Declaration, the essence of necessity is that only military objectives may 
be targeted.140 Resorting to Additional Protocol I, militaryobjectives arethose 
objects, which, by their nature, location, purpose or use, effectively contribute to the 
enemy's war-fighting or war-sustaining capability and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture, or neutralization would constitute a definite military advantage 
under the circumstances at the time of the attack.141 
It is not difficult to confuse this concept with the requirement of 
proportionality. Proportionality involves an excessive number of noncombatant 
casualties resulting from an attack on an unquestionably military object; necessity, 
the other hand, concerns the cumulative impact of attacks against particular targets 
which renders their characterization as a military object questionable.1'*2 
on 
See DOCUMENTS ON LAW OF WAR, supra note 119; Gardam, supra note 138, at 397. 
1
 Article 52, Protocol I Additional; Roach, supra note 119, at 596. 
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 Hampson, supra note 133, at 46 Professor Hampson notes that there is an overlap in the two 
principles. She characterizes the issue of attacking Iraqi bridges during the Persian Gulf War as one of 
proportionality because of the number of civilian casualties resulting from those airstrikes- she 
concludes that the attacks on the Iraqi electrical power system, because of the long-term effects they 
had on the civilian population of Iraq, is a question of proportionality. Having made that distinction, it 
is relatively easy to not see the subtle difference in the two principles. 
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Where necessity will be at issue in information warfare will be against those 
systems or resources that have a dual use capability among a state's military forces 
and its civilian population. Such systems will be those integrally connected to or 
supporting power systems, communications lines, logistics and other supply 
networks. 
The experience of the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf War is instructive in 
determining the application of the principle of necessity toinformation warfare. 
During that conflict, coalition forces targeted and repeatedly bombed objects that 
served the needs of the Iraqi armed forces but also the civilian population: oil storage 
sites; power stations and factories; railways, bridges, airports and ports used for the 
deployment of military forces and the movement of supplies.143 
The targets in information warfare are likely to include communications and 
electrical power circuits. These broad categories of targets can subdivided into more 
discrete categories such as local or wide area military communications networks; 
switching stations for rail transportation; air traffic controller networks; and port 
facility communication networks. Potential targets could possibly include a state's 
financial network database or telephone cable-based communications system.144 
These targets might be strained to apply the concept of necessity. 
A comparison to the law of naval warfare is instructive in determining the 
lawfulness of targeting a dual use information system Any vessel, other than a 
warship, owned or operated by a belligerent possesses military character, regardless 
143
 Rogers, supra note 132, at 41-42. 
One study noted that over 95% of the Department of Defense telecommunications network is based 
on shared-use civilian systems. Rattray, supra note 46, at 82. 
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as an 
of whether it is operating under a neutral flag or bears neutral markings.,45 That is, 
any neutral vessel acquires enemy character and may be treated by a belligerent 
enemy warship when engaged in the following acts: taking a direct part in the 
hostilities on the side of the enemy; or acting in any capacity as an auxiliary to the 
enemy's armed forces.146   
Acquiring military character, then, depends on the degree of control exercised 
over the object and, more essentially, ther importance of the object to the warfighting 
effort. Aside from the obvious military objectives like enemy warships and aircraft, 
proper military objectives to include in targeting include lines of communication and 
other objects used to conduct or support military advantage.147 
Similarly, capabilities that are not exclusively used for military purposes may 
nonetheless be targeted if those capabilities or facilities indirectly but effectively 
support and sustain the enemy's war-fighting ability.148 On this basis, for example, 
the Union's destruction of Confederate cotton fields during the Civil War was lawful 
because the Confederacy used profits from the sale of cotton to fund its arms 
purchases.149 
Likewise, the oil transportation systems of Iraq and Iran during their war in 
the 1980's were legitimate military targets because each side used profits from the 
145 
146 
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sale of their oil to fund their respective war-fighting capabilities.150 Specifically, Iran 
financed almost all of its war effort through sales of its oil; Iraq targeted merchant 
vessels carrying Iranian oil that were sailing in exclusion zones publicly declared by 
Iraq to be zones in which it would target vessels suspected of carrying Iranian oil.151 
As these Iraqi attacks on otherwise neutral vessels were aimed at interfering with 
Iran's war-sustaining capability, these merchant vessels acquired the character of Iran 
and, thus, were lawful targets under the law of armed conflict.152 
With these points in mind, the initial focus would be whether the information 
system to be targeted has acquired enemy character. It may acquire this character if 
controlled by the opponent or if serving any capacity as an auxiliary to its war efforts. 
Another way of stating this is to determine whether the information system so 
effectively contributes to the opponent's war-fighting or war-sustaining capability 
such that its destruction or disablement would constitute a definite military advantage 
under the circumstances.   If so, it may then be targeted. If not, it may not be 
targeted. 
In this respect, attacks on a state's financial network, that is, the national stock 
market exchange, if any, and connections to banking facilities, might arguably be 
justified. Although a seemingly non-military objective, this information system could 
become a legitimate target if, but only if, there was some real connection between it 
and the state's war-sustaining effort. Without such a connection, there would be no 
150
 Id at 597. 
151
 Id at 603. 
132
 Id at 604. 
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/'■ 
military advantage obtained by attacking such a system and, therefore, such an attack 
would be unlawful 
Similarly, an attack on the telecommunications network of an opponent could 
be justified if that network is used in command and control functions or for supply 
and personnel transportation. Again, the focus at this point is not on the shared-use 
nature of a system, but, mstead, solely On its utility to the war effort. 
The difficult question would be whether the connections of that network to _ 
other nation s or to multinational corporations involved in that network, or simply the 
presence of more civilian beneficiaries in that information system, would change the 
analysis. It is tempting to leap quickly and conclude that the analysis would be 
changed. That is likely to be the case, but, if so, it will not be because the information 
system is not a military object. Rather, it will be because the attack on such a system 
would result in a disproportionate effect on non-military components and persons in 
that system. As such, it would be more appropriate to consider this question under 
the rubric of proportionality. 
5. Proportionality 
Because proportionality, whether under Protocol I or under a customary law 
articulation, necessarily involves a balancing of civilian lives and property against 
military benefit, this part of information warfare will garner the most difficult 
analysis. As 
49 
to the law of armed conflict generally, the principle of proportionality is a conundrum 
that has probably never been, nor ever will be, solved.153 
Reference to the Persian Gulf War is once again instructive in assessing the 
parameters of this concept. If anything, that war showed the difficulty in applying the 
principles of discrimination and proportionality because of the commingling of   - 
military and civilian targets.154 The coalition forces destroyed Iraq's electrical power 
grid and targeted several bridges among other targets." The power system was used, in 
addition to its military function, to power the nation's water supply and irrigation 
systems, refrigerate medicines, and provide power to hospitals and homes! The 
destruction inflicted on the Iraqi civilian population was undeniable.155 This was so 
even though there were undoubted military advantages to targeting these systems.156 
Because of the collateral devastation wreaked on these military objectives, the 
coalition was sharply criticized for its perceived failure to take account of those 
153
 Schachter, Implementing Limitations on the Use of Force: The Doctrine of Proportionality and 
Necessity, 86 Proc. Am. See. Int'l L. 39 (1992X"Centuries of discussions by philosophers and jurists 
about the meaning of the concepts of proportionality and necessity in human affairs do not seem to 
have produced general definitions cap^ecfaiiswering-concrete issues.").  
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 Schachter, supra note 105, at 466. Professor Schachter concluded that, as the coalition forces 
destroyed most of the means of modem life support in Iraq by bombing her power plants, bridges, 
roads, and communications facilities, the standards for discrimination and proportionality had little 
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J. W. Crawford, The Law ofNoncombatant Immunity and the Targeting of National Electrical 
Power Systems, 21-FALL Fletcher F. World Aff 101,110 (1997), noting that an estimated 70,000 
civilian deaths resulted directly from the bombing during the air campaign and indirectly from the 
effects of the loss of most of the nation's power generating system The loss of power resulted in 
decreased hospital capacity, spoilage of essential vaccines and other medicines, loss in agriculture 
output because of failed irrigation systems, and increase in disease from loss of power to purify and 
distribute water. 
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collateral effects.157 Indeed, some have suggested that the experience in the Gulf War 
shows that targeting decisions must go beyond considering the "direct" collateral 
effects of an attack and consider also the long-term indirect effects.158 
Additionally, assuming Protocol I applies, a military commander is required 
by Protocol I to make a determination that the military advantage to be gained by 
targeting the commercial satellite outweighs the collateral or incidental damage to the 
civilian population.     The Protocol prohibits the mä^scriminate attack of civilians, 
and ^discriminate attacks include those which may be expected to cause incidental -=: 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.160 
Article 51.5 provides: 
Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as 
mdiscriminate:  ._   ... ----- 
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats 
as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and 
distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other 
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(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof,which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.161 
In this respect, a lawful attack on a military objective could be deemed illegal   '/ 
because of its ^discriminate effect on a civilian population. This outcome would 
ensue because the benefits gained by the attack would be outweighed by the harm 
caused, even indirectly, to the civilian population. Essentially; this is the argument of 
those who criticized some of the coalition targeting decisions mthe<julf War. '■■-'■ 
An attack on a particular communications satellite could, for example, have 
catastrophic, albeit unintended, collateral effects. It is nearly beyond debate that 
communications and information links are essential to the proper ordering of daily 
life. The growing dependency of states on the benefits provided by different types of 
satellites has probably changed the equation for assessing what is mdiscriminate 
effect. A nation's reliance on satellites for internal and international communications, 
agricultural assessments, resource location, and flood management and other 
environmental protection could provide a basis to conclude that the loss of the ability 
to tap these benefits would constitute an impermissible collateral effect 
A civilian population without an essential telecommunications network 
wrought by its destruction could have devastating consequences in health care, 
financial security, commerce, agricultural output, and, potentially, maintaining 
161
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various life-sustaining processes. It is not too far-fetched to think that the loss of a 
navigational satellite system could result in an untimely delivery of medicines and 
essential foodstuffs. Protocol I Additional prohibits attacks which render useless 
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.,62 
In addition, the lawprohibits indiscriminate attacks, that is, ones that either - - 
directly or negligently target civilians. This proscription is found in Protocol I as well 
/■'- 
as customary law. This limitation could affect the method of information warfare  
chosen for a mission. For example, a logic bomb is planted into a computer's 
circuitry and then "activated" at some latertime. It would be an mdiscriminate attack 
to plant a logic bomb in a computer or a network without some reasonably confident 
idea where that bomb would be activated. If a state simply let loose a logic bomb not 
knowing what foreign information system it would detonate in, then, arguably, such a 
tactic would violate the rule against discrimination. 
Likewise, any other method of information warfare that would not have a 
reasonably predictable field or scope of destructive application would be prohibited 
by this principle. Thus, a virus could potentially be forbidden as a means of 
information warfare since a virus by its "nature" propagates without limitation to 
infect whatever system to which it is provided access. A virus could be proscribed, -_— 
then, if there is a reasonable certainty that the foreign defense ministry's network, 
which was the primary focus of the virus, would provide the virus access, even 
indirectly, to its civilian telecommunications network. 
162
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Another troubling issue would be the type and duration of warfare selected. 
If, to gain the desired military advantage, one is not required to destroy the targeted 
military object, then the laws of armed conflict forbid using force that is more than 
necessary. One justification for the continued bombing of the Iraqi electrical system, 
even though it was neutralized early in the air campaign, was to prevent Iraq from 
restoring its system and, thereby, its war-fighting ability.163 The question here would 
/" 
be whether a particular method of information warfare would be too much force in 
relation to the desired end. That is, if a state can effectively disrupt communications 
lines by flooding the telecommunications circuits with1 simultaneous dialirigs, should 
it be limited from using a method that has longer-lasting detrimental effects? 
During the Gulf War, the coalition used precision guided missiles that 
purportedly avoided a great amount of unnecessary collateral destruction. This raised 
the question whether the states were then obligated to use these missiles in all 
airstrikes.164 The consensus appears to be that states were not so required, but 
probably because the number of these missiles in the overall arsenal was not 
significant.165 Also, the need to assure protection for the coalition forces permitted 
them not to have to rely entirely on the precision munitions. 
Nonetheless, in information warfare, if a state could conceivably strike an 
information system with an electronic means of attack as opposed to a conventional 
airstrike, the question exists whether the state would be obliged to do so if doing so 
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results in significantly less collateral damage. At this stage in the development of 
information warfare, and in light of the Gulf War-PGM experience, we are probably 
not yet at that stage. Warfare could, however, progress to that point where such non- 
lethal, precision strikes may be required by the customs of warfare over less precise, 
more destructive methods. -—  — 
6. Neutrality - 
The concept of neutrality in war emerged with the early development of 
international maritime law;166-■Maritime states sought to resist belligerents 
interference with neutral maritime trade during the 18fe and 19th centuries, and the law 
of neutrality developed through custom as a result.167 Neutrality emerged from the 
Hague 1907 Conventions as the subject of two different treaties concerning neutrality 
in case of war on land (Hague V) and at sea (Hague XIII).168 In each convention, the 
theme for neutrality was of impartiality. That is, neutral powers had the right to not 
become the target of either belligerent but had the duty to ensure that neither 
belligerent seized an advantage from either the neutral state or its citizens.169 A state 
lost its neutrality if it assisted one of the belligerents in any manner and not the other 
or permitted its citizens to likewise assist one of the belligerents to the other's --- 
166
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exclusion.      Thus, the principal right of neutrality is inviolability of territorial 
integrity while the principal duties of neutrality are abstention and impartiality.171 
A principal purpose of the law of neutrality is to protect neutral commerce. 
Neutral commerce involves all commerce between a neutral state and another neutral 
state not involving materials of war or armaments destined for a belligerent, and all 
commerce between a neutral and a belligerent that does not involve the carriage of 
contraband or otherwise sustain the belligerent's war-fighting capability.172 As 
mentioned, above, a neutral power can acquire enemy character, and become a 
legitimate target, if h, inter alia, operates directly under enemy control, orders, 
charter, employment, or direction.173 
Given the type of architecture used in the world's interconnected information 
systems, the question of neutrality in information warfare includes the issue of 
whether a state loses its neutrality by not preventing a belligerent from using, for 
example, its telecommunications system in conducting information warfare.174 
Likewise, the risk faced by a civilian company based in a neutral state of becoming a 
170
 Articles 5 and 9, Hague V, which provide: A Neutral Power must not allow [belligerents to move 
troops or war materials across its territory, permit belligerents to erect communications stations or use 
existing stations for purely military communications] and apply impartially to each side any 
restrictions the neutral Power imposes and ensure its citizens do not violate this impartiality, Articles 6 
and 9, Hague XTJI provide: the supplying of a belligerent with of war materials is prohibited; 
restrictions against belligerents must be applied impartially. 
171
 NWP 1-14M, supra note 133, para. 7.2; AFP 110-31, supra note 133, para. 2.6; FM 27-10, supra 
note 134, para 512. 
172
 NWP 1-14M, supra note 133, para 7.4; David L. Peace, Neutrality, The Rights of Shipping, and the 
Use of Force in The Persian Gulf War, 82 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 146,147-149 (1988). 
173
 Roach supra note 119, at 598-599; NWP 1-14M, supra note 133, para 7.5.2; Todd A Wynkoop, 
The Use of Force Against Third Party Neutrals to Enforce Economic Sanctions Against a Belligerent, 
42 Naval L. Rev. 91 (1995). 
The issue will also include whether use of a third party's satellite makes that satellite a legitimate 
non-neutral target That issue will be discussed more fully, infra. 
56 
target will also be raised. Another issue will be whether a belligerent can conceivably 
cross through a neutral power's "cyber" territory on its way to attacking the other side 
to a conflict. -, ;        : ;. 
As to the first question, neither of the Hague neutrality conventions does not 
obligates a neutral state to prevent a belligerent from using its communications 
apparatus.     Similarly, a neutral state is not obliged toprevent its citizens from 
sharing private communications facilities with belligerents, again, so long as 
impartiality is observed.176 Thus, a neutral state would not lose its neutrality if it 
permitted each side to a conflict access to a locally-based civilian Internet Service 
Provider. ----- -■ '■■- 
The more difficult question is whether a neutral's territory can be violated by 
a belligerent's computer virus happening to pass through that state's information 
system network because of the machinations in the belligerent state's router. Put 
differently, are there neutral zones in cyberspace? The answer could depend on 
whether a state can claim sovereignty over different components of the global 
information infrastructure. Presumably, a state must have some territory over which 
to claim neutrality. Conversely, information warfare could expand the notion of 
neutrality to the point where the principle is violated if the state causes some impact 
on any area other than ksoWn by some aggressive act. m this respect, it would not 
matter what course an information attack takes over the GH. ft is sufficient that it 
175
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courses over some parts of it other than that state's and the receiving state's parts of 
the GEL 
There will be a practical problem in ensuring neutrality in information 
systems. The best way to ensure neutrality would be for a neutral state to impose 
blocks on access to its information systems rather than insist that belligerents stay 
away. Doing this, though, may risk that state losing equally neutral communications 
and connections from other neutral states. This would probably be too high a price, 
so, the more likely outcome will be that neutral states will not impede access to its 
information systems by any party to ä conflict; : __ :: 
Should cyberspace become an internationally protected zone, similar to outer 
space or the high seas?177 This question would be similar to the one feeing 
international scholars since the dawn of Sputnik regarding the delimitation of outer 
space and territorial airspace.178 As a result of the shock wave that Sputnik sent 
through the international legal system, the United Nations created the Committee on 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.179 That Committee drafted the Principles on the Use 
of Outer Space180 which served as the cornerstone for the Outer Space Treaty.181 The 
Outer Space Treaty provided that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and, 
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as such, would be used only for peaceful purposes and the common benefit of 
mankind.182 
Similarly, the United Nations through the years has sponsored several 
initiatives to codify the customary law of the sea. In 1982, the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea produced a comprehensive treaty regarding the 
ocean spaces and the attendant rights and duties of states in, under, and over those .---•- 
.spaces.     UNCLOS provides for the division of the oceans into discrete spaces and, 
as one goes further from the landmass of a coastal state;, lessening rights of 
.sovereignty over those spaces.,84 Ultimately, the oceans become the high seas,   ... 
which, like outer space, are the common heritage of mankind, and over which no state 
may lay a claim of sovereignty.185 
Conversely, in the other major technological development of this century, the 
birth of aircraft, states faced the choice of treating the airspace above its territory as 
free, international spaces like the high seas or as restricted national areas similar to its 
landmasses and internal waters Eventually, in the Chicago Convention of 1944,186 
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they chose to apply notions of territorialhy to the airspace above its territory and grant 
limited and conditional rights of entry into those airspaces.I87 
It is probably too early in the development of the technology of cyberspace 
and issues that will result from this development, for example, as it concerns the 
commission of domestic criminal offenses, to try to identify neutral or international 
spaces in cyberspace.IS* A more prudent course would be to allow that par^ of the 
/" 
law to develop further and then proceed from there to solving this issue. By enacting 
and implementing domestic criminal laws for acts committed in cyberspace, states are 
showing an intention to treat certain parts of the global information infrastructure as   : 
sovereign territory. As such, the resolution of the "neutrality" and sovereignty over 
cyberspace will probably follow the course of national airspace as reflected in the 
Chicago Convention. As such, it is unlikely that a "common heritage" portion of 
cyberspace, similar to outer space or the high seas, will be carved out. Consequently, 
the notion of neutrality will probably continue to exist in the uses of cyberspace and 
information warfare. r 
7. Ruses and Perfidy. 
Another challenge to the application of traditional notions of the laws 
concerning the use of force and armed conflict will be in the area of ruses and perfidy 
or the law of chivalry. The law of armed conflict permits deceiving the enemy 
187
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through stratagems and ruses of war to mislead him, to deter him from taking action, 
or to induce him to act recklessly, provided the ruses do not violate rules of 
international law applicable to armed conflict.189 The law, however, forbids the resort 
to treacherous means to kill or injure the enemy, and this is called perfidy.190 These 
principles have attained customary status and are restated in Hague Convention IV 
and in Additional Protocol I.191 .   -^ _ : V^ ^   . 
The Regulations to Hague IV provide at article 23 that it is forbidden to kill or 
wound treacherously or to make improper use of a flag of truce* or of the national flag 
or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy.192 Hague TV described these 
means as examples of treacherous acts, but perfidy was not further defined  
Additional Protocol I, however, defined perfidy as acts inviting the confidence 
of an adversary to lead him to beUeve that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, 
protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with 
intent to betray that confidence.193 Examples of perfidy under this definition include 
the feigning of surrender or truce; feigning of incapacitation by wounds or sickness; 
feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; feigning of protected status through use of 
signs unique to the United Nations or neutral or other states not party to the 
189
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conflict.194 The emphasis in Additional Protocol I, then, is to reinforce the 
protections afforded to the different classes of persons addressed in tile four 1949 
Geneva Conventions. 
Whether the principles of ruse and perfidy will limit particular methods of 
information warfare may be assessed by examining the types of warfare permitted 
and not permitted under these principles. The obvious «xamples would be methods 
/■"■ 
that abuse the symbols of protected organizations, neutral states or states not party to 
the conflict. For example, it would probably beperfidy to attempt access to an 
enemy's information system to inject a virus underthe £uise of an electronic ..       
communication emanating from the United Nations or using a domain name 
suggesting the origin of the communication was from a neutral country. 
A more complicated issue, though, would be if such a communication was 
launched under the guise of the enemy country or used a domain name suggesting the 
communication originated in the enemy country. In land and naval war, it is 
permissible to use enemy uniforms, markings or flags to deceive the enemy, so long 
as the true colors are displayed prior to an engagement.195 The rules for aircraft 
prohibit using enemy markings at any time under the reasoning that, once airborne, an 
aircraft cannot readily change its markings like ground troops or a naval vessel can.196 
This presents the question whether a disguised communication is more like 
war on land and at sea, or like war in the air, or something different. Reviewing ruses 
that have been deemed acceptable may help in determining the answer. Permitted 
194
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deceptions include false intelligence information, electronic deceptions, and use of 
enemy codes, passwords, and countersigns.197 Some commentators suggest the 
prohibition in Additional Protocol I against the use of emblems, insignia or uniforms 
refers only to concrete visual targets and not to signals and codes.193 This view of the 
limits on using enemy emblems, insignia or uniforms is implemented on the U.S, 
services' handbooks on the laws concerning armed conflict.199 
It would appear, based on these examples, that disguising a communication to r 
inject a virus into an information system would not be improper since it is simply 
using enemy codes or signals. One could reasonably argue, though, that'the disguised 
communication is more properly like the mismarked aircraft and, particularly when 
the system to be infected is used for civilian purposes along with the military use, it 
would be perfidious to cripple the non-military component ofthat system. 
The former view is very likely to be the acceptable view among states. The 
counter-argument actually goes more to necessity and proportionality than it does to 
perfidy. This is because the ruse employed does not invite the possible wrongfiil 
abuse of or damage to a protected status under the Geneva Conventions. 
Accordingly, such uses of information warfare will not necessarily be limited by the 
law concerning ruses and perfidy. 
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8. Espionage.200 
Another aspect of the law of armed conflict that may impact on information 
warfare is the law concerning espionage  Traditionally, a spy is any person who acts 
clandestinely or under false pretenses and obtains, or attempts to obtain, information 
in the zone of operations of a belligerent j with the intention ofcommunicating it to 
the hostile party.201 - : 
Although the Hague Rules do not condition the acts of a spy on intrusion into 
another state's territory, customary law has traditionally limited acts of espionage to 
acts occurring within the territory of the state that is the subject of the acts of   !; - 
spying.202 As such, customary law permits a state to forbid others from 
photographing strategic objects and events taking place within its territory. 
200
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Conversely, the 1CJ effectively held in The Corfu Channel Case204 that a 
maritime state had the right to engage in strategic observation in the course of 
conducting innocent passage through a coastal state's territorial waters.205 
From this follows the corollary that observation from international spaces, like 
the high seas or the airspace over the high seas, is not prohibited by international 
law.     Satellite observation and remote sensing from outer space of sovereign 
territories has long been considered an acceptable state practice.207 
This view was implicitly suggested by the United States after the Soviet 
Union shot down the U-2 pilot, Gary Powers, during his ill-fated reconnaissance 
flight overthe Soviet Union in 1960. The United States admitted responsibility for 
improperly intruding into Soviet airspace, but did not admit to conducting espionage 
operations.208 The international community thought little of this stance by the United 
States, and, consequently, implicitly affirmed the notion that physical presence m 
foreign territory is a prerequisite for spying. Accordingly, observation from areas 




Id.; in that case, a British warship transiting Albania's territorial waters conducted observations of 
Albania's coastal defenses that were threatening to attack the British ship. 
206
 Geoffrey B. DeMarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 321, 335 
(1996). 
E.g., Youseff Sneifer, The Implications of National Security Safeguards on the Commercialization 
of Remote Sensing Imagery, 19 Seattle U. L. Rev. 539 (1996); Richard A. Morgan, Military Use of 
Commercial Communications Satellites: A New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and 'Peaceful 
Purposes,' 60 J. Air L. & Com. 237 (1994); Center for Research of Air and Space Law, SPACE 
ACnvrnES AND EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW 404-406 (N. M Matte ed. 1984). 
208
 Julius Stone, Legal Problems of Espionage in Conditions of Modern Conflict, 29-43, in ESSAYS 
ON ESPIONAGE, supra note 202. As several commentators have noted, there has long been a related 
question whether espionage is an act limited to times of armed conflict or if it can also be committed 
during peacetime. Professor Stone's comments were made in that context and were not meant to 
suggest that observations conducted in national airspace could not otherwise be considered spying 
65 
Unresolved is whether this limitation extends only to international spaces or to 
any non-sovereign area including the territory from which the reconnaissance activity 
is conducted. The answer is important because, if an AW ACS plane operating on the 
high seas in the Persian Gulf can permissibly monitor events inside one of the Gulf 
states, can a person at the National Security Agency (NSA) at Fort Meade, Maryland, 
permissibly monitor transmissions intercepted in cyberspace from that same Gulf 
state? If not, then the monitored state could claim an affront to its territorial integrity 
or political independence in violation of article 2(4) of the Charter.209 
The Hague neutrality rules prohibit using neutral territory as a base of ; 
operations for spying.210 These rules could be used to argue that the territorial 
limitation should be expansive, that is, clandestine operations from any non- 
international space should be prohibited. In this manner, the specialist at the NSA 
would be a spy.   On the other hand, the neutrality rules were meant to reaffirm 
territorial integrity and to protect a neutral state, so they should not control the answer 
here. 
Ultimately, there seems little reason_not to treat the NSA analyst as a spy if 
that person actually is intruding into another state's territory. On the other hand, if 
the analyst is merely flying in cyberspace and "passively" intercepting emissions 
from another state, then he should not be considered a spy. Certainly, the answer will 
depend heavily on the result of trying to delimit cyberspace, if that will be possible. 
209
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At the same time, it is possible to view current attempts to hack into a network 
as nothing other than spying. In such a case, however one views the architecture of 
the information infrastructure, a hacker is breaking into information system resources 
that are physically located in national territory. It really does not matter that the 
hacker travels through different way-stations in cyberspace. What counts is the 
ultimate action of intruding into mainframes or system resources that are - --?■ 
unquestionably inside of a state. In this manner, focusing on where the information 
resides or where it is located when misappropriated confuses the simple fact that an 
intrusion into a defined area has taken place. Thus, assertive and proactive acts into 
identifiable resources inside of a state, rather than passive monitoring, should readily 
be treated as espionage. 
D. International Telecommunications Law 
It is probably a truism to say that telecommunication services, considered in 
their totality, form one of the key infrastructures of modem society.211 The main 
international instrument concerning international telecommunication, the 
International Telecommunications Convention,212 impacts on information warfare. 
There should not be much debate that the Convention will permit a stateto take 
defensive action when threatened with information attacks. Indeed, the Convention 
reaffirms a state's essential right to defend itself and its citi2ens. 
211
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Article 18 of the Convention provides that the right of the public to 
correspond by means of the international service is recognized. In article 19(1), 
however, the member states of the Convention reserve the right to stop the 
transmission of any private telegram which may appear dangerous to the security of 
the State or contrary to their laws, to public order, or to decency, provided that the 
state immediately notifies the office of origin of the stoppage of any such telegram or 
A- 
any part thereof. The state may withhold notification if the security of the state would 
be placed in danger. —         
By article 19(2), member states further reserve theright tocut off any other 
private telecommunications which may present a danger to state security or be 
contrary to their laws, public decency, or public order. Moreover, states reserve the 
right to suspend the international telecommunications service for an indefinite time, 
either generally or for certain relations and for certain kinds of correspondence. 
Applying these principles, states are permitted to employ measures like 
jamming frequencies in situations where extraterritorial transmissions disturb national 
airspace, threaten national security, or threaten domestic values.713 As an example of 
the domestic implementation of the Convention, in the United States, the President is 
authorized by section 606 of the Communications Act of 1934214 to exercise certain 
authority during a war or upon a proclamation that there exists a war or a threat of 
war, or a state of peril or other national emergency and suspend telecommunication 
213
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services within the United States and to use or control any radio or wire facility or 
station. 
Thus, the Convention clearly permits a state under information attack to 
suspend or block the medium of transmitting those attacks. There would be no 
proscription against a state taking such protective measures, then, in the face of an 
actual or threatened attack whether it be from an opposing state or private source,215 
Another important aspect of international telecommunications law is the 
requirement that the satellite networks on which telecommunications is based be used 
for peaceful purposes. INMARSAT216 and INTELSAT,2-17 international satellite 
organizations created by treaties, through their constitutive documents and internal 
legal opinions, have expressed their understanding of the principle. 
INMARSAT provides maritime satellite services for communications and 
navigation. In the 1980's it concluded that its services could be used by warships 
during peacetime but,rduring hostilities, only for actions pursuant to U.N. resolutions 
and for purposes recognized by international humanitarian law like rescue of persons 
215
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or vessels in distress; aiding the sick and wounded; and other purposes related to 
navigational safety or distress.218 
INTELSAT, meanwhile, provides commercial telecommunications satellite 
services. Its constitutive document provides that services may be used for 
"specialized telecommunications services, other than for military purposes." This 
provision has been interpreted only to proscribe the provision by INTELSAT Of 
specially dedicated satellites for military use but not to prohibit military use of a 
satellite that afready provides commercial satellite services.219 
During the Persian^ Gulf War, INMARSAT and INTELSAT Resourceswere 
used by each side in the conflict. The Director General of INMARSAT expressed 
concern that the U.S. Navy used its services impermissibly for nonpeaceful purposes 
while the U.S. maintained that the services were used in support of the U.N. 
resolutions which necessarily implied a peaceful purpose.220 Nonetheless, the State 
Department advised the Director General that any planned INMARSAT usage 
beyond that in support of U.N. resolutions would be consistent with the INMARSAT 
Convention.221 In so doing, the State Department seemed to indicate agreement with 
the Director General's position, but the State Department's reply to INMARSAT was 
fairly ambiguous because it did not directly concede agreement with the Director 
General's conclusions. It is thus unclear whether the U.S. shares this view of the 
limits of "peaceful purposes" held by INMARSAT. 
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INTELSAT has not disagreed with the view that militaries may use 
commercial services satellites to conduct military operations because such uses are 
not pursuant to a "specialized service" from INTELSAT.222 Thus, it did not object to 
the use of its commercial service resources during the conflict. 
This suggests that any aggressive type of information warfare would probably 
be unlawful under the INMARSAT and INTELSAT charters. Defensive information 
warfare would probably be unlawful under the INMARSAT charter unless premised 
on an internationally-recognized basis in favor of humanitarian principles. Under the 
INTELSAT charter, defensive information warfare would not be unlawful 
E. Space Law 
The final area of substantive law to examine for the international limits on the 
use of information warfare as a means of conducting warfare is the law concerning 
outer space. The Magna Carta of outer space, so to speak,223 is the Outer Space 
Treaty.224 Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty provides that outer space will be 
reserved for peaceful purposes.225 Although article IV only provides technically that 
the moon and celestial bodies shall be used for peaceful purposes, it has generally 
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been accepted since the dawn of the space age that "outer space shall be used 
exclusively for peaceful purposes."226 The question, then, is whether using space- 
bound assets like telecommunications satellites, or targeting such satellites, to 
facilitate information warfare is prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty. 
Since the space age began in the 1950's, two schools of thought have arisen 
concerning the meaning of the peaceful purposes clause. One view is that "peaceful 
purposes" means nonmilitary actions.227 The opposing view is that the term means 
nonaggressive actions. The United States has consistently held that "peaceful 
purposes" is limited to nonaggressive actions.228 This view is based on reference to ^ 
Article in of the Outer Space Treaty which provides that all space activities shall be 
in accordance with the U.N. Charter.229 Because the Charter permits states to use 
force in self-defense, the term "peaceful purposes" must also permit the use of 
defensive force and only ban aggressive, offensive acts which are, likewise, banned 
by the Charter.230  - 
Similarly, other parts of the Outer Space Treaty mention concepts like, 
"common interest of all mankind," "benefit of all peoples," "broad international 
cooperation," "maintaining peace and security," and "use in accordance with 
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international law," and provide a basis to support the "nonaggressive" 
interpretation.231 On this basis, outer space is to be used in a cooperative way to 
benefit all peoples and in a manner which does not jeopardize international peace and 
security.232 In this respect, the use of space for "aggressive" information warfare 
would be inconsistent with the Charter and, therefore, inconsistent with the Outer 
SpaceTreaty. 
A reasonable argument can be made that, viewing solely the language of the 
Treaty, the nonmilitary interpretation of the clause is the correct one.233 Quite simply, 
however, the drafters could have specifically provided for the exclusion of military 
uses of outer space but chose not to do so. Early on, the former Soviet Union 
espoused this view but quickly changed course after its military satellite program 
was, so to speak, launched and off the ground.234 Thereafter, in applying the Outer 
Space Treaty, the United States and the former Soviet Union, as the preeminent space 
powers, consistently showed their understanding of the term "peaceful purposes" as 
meaning nonaggressive.235 Significantly, no state has ever formally protested the 
United States interpretation of this clause.236 Pursuant to the Vienna Convention on 
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the Law of Treaties,237 therefore, the interpretation of the term "peaceful purposes" as 
meaning nonaggressive and not nonmilitary is the accurate interpretation.238 
A useful comparison to the law of the sea can be made to support the view 
that "peaceful purposes" does not mean "nonmilitary." The law of the sea recognizes 
the right of armed vessels of a state to patrol the high seas to maintain,-for example, - 
the United Nations' commitment to maintaining international peace and security.23? 
Also, as a matter of customary law and the Law of the Sea Convention, states may 
lawfully conduct military exercises on the high seas so long as they are carried out 
with due regard for the maintenance of other states' high seas freedoms.240 As such, 
the law of the sea is a sufficiently comparable regime to the law of outer space to 
conclude that "peaceful purposes" in each regime has the same meaning. 
As a post-script to this discussion, there have been attempts to classify 
particular military uses of outer space as peaceful or nonpeaceful and identify the 
uses that do violate the Outer Space Treaty. In this manner, the "nonaggressive" 
interpretation of "peaceful purposes" is acknowledged as the valid one but holds that 
not all military uses of outer space are peaceful Certainly, the prohibited uses in 
Article IV of the Treaty are self-evident. A state could not, for example, station a 
nuclear missile launcher in outer space nor deploy other weapons of mass destruction 
there. Conversely, peaceful uses, which, because of states' tack acceptance of them 
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as not violating the Treaty, include communications, remote sensing, and 
•        •        241 
navigation. 
Proposals to classify the following uses of spaces as nonpeaceful include: the 
use of force or the threat of the use offeree in outer space or in the earth environment 
by a space object or being in outer space; the use offeree or the threat of the use of 
force against a space object or a being in space by any method or means; and the use 
/'; 
of space objects to assist in and aid military operations.242 Other proposed 
delimitations focus on those uses that have a destabilizing effect on international 
i •      243 peace and security. :: : :  
These efforts are probably doomed for being overly inclusive and exclusive. 
One can readily see that satellite uses that "aid in military operations" do not pose a 
threat to international security when used, for example, by a carrier battle group for 
inter-group communications during a predeployment exercise. As such, this 
definition is too inclusive. 
Also, the proposed limitations tend to focus primarily on nuclear and other 
weapons of mass destruction and do not always consider tactical weapons that are not 
traditionally classified as weapons of mass destruction. More pertinently, they do not 
really account for information warfare techniques. For example, it would 
undoubtedly be nonpeacefol for a state to initiate an attack by launching conventional 
weapons through space to strike another state's electrical power system, but the 
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proposed limitations do not provide for this scenario. This definition, then, is too 
exclusive. 
A better limitation based on the purposes of the particular activity, that is, for 
a benign purpose or for aggressive reasons, has been suggested.244 This is a more 
flexible and realistic approach to determining whether a particular activity in space is 
peaceful or not. On this basis, use of a satellite to facilitate an aggressive means of 
information warfare would make that use nonpeaeeful and, thus, prohibited by the 
Outer Space Treaty. ~ 
A related question would be whether the Outer Space Treaty proscribes the 
use of outer space in self-defense against an unquestionably aggressive use of force in 
violation of article 2(4) of the Charter. Despite the clarity of Article 51, some writers 
hold that the Outer Space Treaty precludes the use of force in outer space even as a 
defensive measure.245 Some view Article 51 as being neutralized by the lex specialis 
nature of the Outer Space Treaty.246 - 
Conversely, assuming the "nonmilitary" view of the "peaceful purposes" 
clause is correct, self-defense should be seen as a special exception to this rule 
because the application of international law in outer space implies that States may 
exercise their right of self-defense against space activities of other States.247 
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The prevailing view, though, is that the Outer Space Treaty does not preclude 
the use offeree in self-defense in outer space.248 The well-established rule for the 
United States that "peaceful purposes" includes the right of self-defense was stated by 
Senator Al Gore, Sr., in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly in 1962: 
It is the view of the United States that outer space should be 
used only for peaceful—that is nonaggressive and beneficial— 
/" 
purposes. The question of military activities in space cannot be 
divorced from the question of military activities on earth. [...] [T]he 
test of any space activity must not be whether it is military or  
nonmilitary, but whether or not it is consistent with the UN Charter 
and other obligations of law.249 
This right of self-defense in outer space is again analogous to the right of self- 
defense on the high seas. Although the Law of the Sea Convention provides for the 
use of the high seas for peaceful purposes, as a long-standing matter of customary 
law, a state has always retained the right to defend itself against the use offeree on 
the high seas.250 . ..   . ..        
The issues involving the right to anticipatory self-defense, what acts may be 
considered to violate article 2(4) and permitting the use of defensive force pursuant to 
article 51, and the principles of necessity, proportionality, and humanity, each 
discussed earlier, also apply in this context, hi summary, if a state uses outer space in 
248
 Hurwitz, supra note 226, at 73; Morgan, supra note 207, at 308. 
249
 UN Doc A/C 1/PV. 1289 at 13 (1962), quoted in Kunich, supra note 229, at 133-134. Senator 
Gore's speech was equally influential in setting forth the U. S. policy position on the meaning of the 
"peaceful purposes" provision of the Outer Space Treaty. 
250
 Hurwitz, supra note 226, at 73; Kunich, supra note 229, at 133. 
77 
an aggressive manner in violation of article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, that state would 
also violate the requirement of the Outer Space Treaty to use outer space for peaceful 
purposes. The object state would be permitted to respond, even in outer space, 
pursuant to article 51 of the Charter. It is arguable whether a state could employ 
measures in outer space in anticipation of an aggressive attack, but, based on states' 
practice, anticipatory measures probably could be taken without violating the Charter 
or the Outer Space Treaty. 
DL Conclusion 
The foregoing article has shown that information warfare is a concept and 
method of conducting warfare that currently is in a nascent stage and difficult to 
circumscribe.251 This article has reviewed how traditional concepts of the laws of 
armed conflict found in conventional and customary law may limit the ways 
information warfare is used a means of war and in self-defense. One senses that the 
use of information warfare by a state's military forces will qualify as a use of force, 
but the current problem is in determining when the threshold to qualify as a use of 
force is crossed. That is, it is difficult to say whether a particular use of information 
warfare is or is not "force," 
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Whether information warfare qualifies as "force" will determine the 
applicability of the traditional laws of armed conflict and its subset of humanitarian 
law. Unless "force" exists, those laws will not apply. 
This is not to say a use of information warfare not constituting a use offeree 
will not be limited by other principles of international law. The Declarations on      - 
Intervention and Friendly Relations will be very important instruments in limiting the 
extent to which a state may engage in information warfare. -—-_.-- 
Assuming the laws of armed conflict apply, it will be challenging to define the 
limits of necessity and proportionality in employing information warfare techniques. : 
The experience of the Persian Gulf War has shown that traditionally military targets 
like electrical power systems and other information-based systems may possibly be 
evolving into impermissible targets because of the interconnection and 
interdependence of those systems with the civilian population. 
Additionally, information warfare will test the limits of the concepts of 
neutrality and espionage. The application of principles of neutrality will depend in 
part on the ability of states to identify discrete portions of the Gil that legitimately 
can be called sovereign territory. Without such designations, it will be difficult to 
locate neutral areas in the Gil except for tangible objects like satellites and computer 
hardware. 
Similarly, it will be difficult to find some state has engaged in espionage in 
the non-hardware portions of a state's Nil without such designations. Since 
espionage is dependent on notions of territoriality, the existence of such "territory" in 
the Nil will be a predicate applying this principle to information warfare. It is more 
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likely that states will not expand this concept and will instead limit its application to 
situations where its computer hardware and other physical components of national 
information systems are actually invaded or accessed 
The converse solution to these related issues, identifying international and, 
hence, non-sovereign areas in the GH, is unlikely to occur. The more probable 
solution will be to attempt to carve the GH into sovereign areas similar to the way 
national and international airspaces have developed in the law of aviation. 
The law of outer space and international telecommunications may serve a role 
in limiting the use of information warfare. What constitutes permissible or 
nonpermissible uses of the GH could be facilitated by the understanding of "peaceful 
purposes" under the Outer Space Treaty. These laws will complement the 
proscriptions in the U.N. Charter regarding the use offeree and threat of aggression. 
These laws, like the Charter, will not, however, prohibit the use offeree in self- 
defense. 
As for self-defense, information warfare promises to raise again the questions 
of whether a state must first receive an armed attack before responding, whether a 
state may engage in anticipatory self-defense, and whether particular responses are 
appropriately proportionate. As a sub-issue, the question whether the concept of 
reprisal is a valid principle of international law, or whether it is really dressed up as 
anticipatory self-defense, will be raised as well 
The outer limits of permissible information warfare, obviously, are not 
defined clearly. The development of those limits may in all likelihood follow the 
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course taken in the efforts to delimit outer space where the shape of the technology 
will help to define the contours of those limits. 
In addition to states' efforts to define domestic crimes and, by implication, the 
limits of jurisdiction and sovereignty, it has been suggested that another way to deter 
information assault is to reach agreement among states as to what will actually 
constitute an assault on sovereignty.252 This would stabilize relations in the 
information warfare arena and prevent those currently unavoidable scenarios where 
one state engages in tactics considered by another state to be an affront to its 
territorial integrity.253 
The international organizations devoted to telecommunications should serve 
an important role in developing the limits of information warfare. In a best case 
scenario, these organizations will enable states to reach consensus on how best to 
peaceably use the Gil for the common benefit. In the worst case scenario, the 
organizations should help to preserve the integrity and utility of the GH for those 
states not parties to an international conflict. 
States should proceed with caution in developing new principles or norms 
solely in the context of the law of armed conflict since the methods of information 
warfare are still developing. Quickly rushing to create new norms risks developing a 
regime that is either too broad or too restrictive - leaving too many gaps to be filled 
or exceptions to be made. It is probably more prudent to apply the existing Charter 
framework of nonintervention, force, and self-defense to developing notions of 




information warfare and to promote common understanding of acts that would be 
considered to fall into the range between "acceptable" coercion and impermissible 
force. 
Nonetheless, consensus on the division between acts of force and those not 
considered to be force is essential. It is essential that the United Nations place this 
matter on its agenda and consider information warfare as a method of conducting 
international conflicts instead of considering only the criminal law enforcement 
aspects of it. The development of a common criminal code is one way to achieve an 
agreed way of applying international law to information warfare. 
Included in such an agreement should be a willingness by states to prosecute 
persons found within a state's territory who commit computer-related offense that are 
consummated in another state. In so doing, states can begin to identify more 
precisely conduct that can be condemned by the international community as well as 
create an incentive to work together in a common way. An indirect result would be a 
better common understanding of acts that constitute "force" in violation of article 2(4) 
of the Charter. Once agreement on this concept offeree is reached, the related issues 
of defensive measures, necessity, proportionality, and humanity should be made more 
amenable to resolution. 
Much more data, though, about the uses, methods, and objectives of 
information warfare should be assembled before a comprehensive treaty can 
realistically be drafted. Creation of a committee in the U.N., similar to COPUOS, to 
receive information and serve as a central point for all of the participants in 
information warfare, is a good way to begin this process. While that committee was 
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initially formed in part to develop principles that would have prevented military 
involvement in outer space, it quickly saw the reality that the militaries of the Soviet 
Union and United States were the dominant actors in that new realm. Accordingly, it 
developed its principles on the beneficial use of outer space in a way that balanced 
competing military interests and legitimate interests of mankind. In like fashion, it 
may be possible, as more information is gathered about the potential uses and 
consequences of information warfare, to develop principles that promote peaceful 
uses of the Gil while at the same time accounting for legitimate concerns for state 
security against foreign attacks. In so doing, order will be provided to the world's 
newest frontier. 
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